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The purpose of this study is to investigate some of the 
issues involved in the hypothesis that political instability 
hinders economic development. The unit of analysis is the 
seventeen Mediterranean nations and the period under analysis 
is 1948-1966.
For the purpose of substantive investigation, the 
hypothesis of a negative relationship between political 
instability and economic development is made.
Methodologically, the study will employ the statistical 
technique of multiple regression analysis to test the stated 
hypotheses. The statistical data for the study are derived 
from two major sources. The data on political instability 
have been compiled by Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, 
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, while the 
economic development data were taken from Arthur S. Banks, 
Cross-Polity Time-Series Data.
Chapter II concerns itself with a review of the literature 
related to political instability and its relationship to economic 
development. In this regard, much of the research is based 
upon the developmental 'causes' of political instability rather 
than the reverse relationship of how political instability retards 
economic development. The latter is the focus of this study.
2
In Chapters III and IV a brief history of each of the 
European and non-European nations is respectively presented. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the interdependence of 
political, social, and economic factors. This area was chosen 
for study because it has the unique characteristic of being 
one of the few parts of the world which contains a number of 
politically unstable states with active disputes and sometimes 
armed conflicts among themselves, and at the same time is the 
scene of a confrontation between the two superpowers. Further­
more, the region not only contains both the traditional locus 
of great power conflict (the Balkans) but is also the source 
of a new one as well, namely, the rising anti-Westernism of 
the Arab states, of which the Jewish state of Israel is the 
symbol and the focus.
The countries of the Mediterranean region represent 
the full range of the continuum of economic development--from 
the high mass-consumption economy of France to the intermediate 
level economy of Greece to the largely traditionally-oriented 
economy of Algeria. The belief that economic performance is 
tempered by the political setting in which economic activity 
takes place is tested in Chapter V as the statistical analysis 
is applied to the data.
Finally, Chapter VI offers a summary of the findings 
and conclusions of the study.
CHAPTER II
INVENTORY OF RESEARCH: POLITICAL INSTABILITY
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
Political stability is one of the most widely used 
concepts in political analysis. Comparative research on 
this concept suggests that there is a lack of uniformity 
as to interpretation.
To some 'stability' means maintenance of a 
particular system of government, a particular 
constitutional order. To others 'stability' may 
mean the continuance of a particular leader, or 
party, or coalition in power. By the first 
definition the French Third Republic was 'stable' 
over a long period of time; by the second, it 
most certainly was not. Yet another definition 
might be concerned with the frequency of political 
violence; an unstable system would be one marked 
by frequent riots, coups, assassinations, or 
rebellions. Another might be concerned with the 
basic economic relationships of the country; an 
unstable state would be one in which ownership of 
the means of production changed sharply. Still i 
other definitions have appeared in the literature.
The dimensions of order and stability have long been 
central themes in classical political theory; violent upheaval
^Bruce Russet, et al.. World Handbook of Political and 
Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University press, 1964),
p. 97.
has become the modus operand! of more than fifty liberation
2movements found mainly in the less developed world. Since 
1900 the governments and social systems of perhaps half the 
world's population have changed by violent means. "Disorderly, 
nonconstitutional political processes have been the dominant
3mode of our era," but protest and change have come to the 
"developed" world too. Americans have experienced mass civil 
protests in their cities and on their campuses during the 
1960s over the issues of racial equality and the war in 
Indochina. Political scientists now realize that politics 
has a violent dimension even in the most developed nations.^
To explore such a concept as political instability, 
it is essential to develop as clear and concise a definition 
as possible within the limitations imposed above. Ivo and 
Rosalind Feierabend present a definition of the political 
instability concept which attempts to relate this phenomenon 
to the political system in which it exists. They state that 
it is defined as:
. . .  the degree or thé amount of aggression 
directed by individuals or groups within the 
political system against other groups or against
2Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Hand­
book of Political and Social Indicators (2nd ed.; New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1^72), p. 59.
3James C. Davies, ed., When Men Revolt and Why: A
Reader in Political Violence and Revolution (New York; Tiïe 
Free Press, 1971), p. 4.
^Taylor and Hudson, World Handbook, p. 59.
the complex of officeholders and individuals and 
groups associated with them. Or, conversely, it 
is the amount of aggression directed by these 
officeholders against other individuals, groups, 
or officeholders within the polity.5
In order to operationalize this definition, seven indicators
of political instability were, chosen.^ The indicators have been
compiled by Charles Hudson and Michael Taylor and are archived
at the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.^
The behavior which we have termed "political instabil­
ity" is often called "violence," "internal conflict," "strife," 
or "disorder," and is distinguished in this study as an integral 
and normal part of the political process, not merely an aberra­
tion to be viewed separately. The recorded events of these 
types of political instability are not to be considered "deviant" 
from moral or empirical norms. Protest demonstrations, for 
example, are frequently legal within a given political system 
and generally nonviolent in terms of injury to persons or damage
Q
to property.
^Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive 
Behavior Within Polities, 1948-1962, A Cross-National Study," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution. X (September, 1966), 250.
^See Appendix A for a description of each indicator of 
political instability.
^Robert Beattie, Assistant Director, International Relations 
Archives, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, 
University ot Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, considers this set 
to be the best available indicators of political instability. 
Telephone interview, Decenber 20, 1972.
O
Taylor and Hudson, World Handbook, p. 63.
6
Individual and group protests may be considered as 
indicators of relations between the rulers and the ruled.
The demonstrations, riots, and armed attacks are acts of 
protest mainly directed against a regime or its policies; 
and, conversely, the regime acts against opposition through 
threatened or actual coercion, sometimes involving violence.^
The universality of individual group protest and 
violence as a form of participation within the political 
system is documented by the fact that only with rare exception 
has a modern government been free of political violence for 
as much as a single decade. The Feierabends have found that 
between 1948 and 1962, internal conflict behavior occurred 
in all but 'one' of 84 nations exam ined.Ted Gurr found, 
in a study of 121 countries for the time period 1961-1967, 
that internal conflict behavior occurred in 114 of the 
nations.
The occurrence of domestic political violence, of 
course, is not unique to the modern nation-state but is a 
well-documented fact in most nations over time. Pitirim 
Sorokim analyzed the histories of eleven European states and
gTaylor and Hudson, World Handbook, p. 63.
^^Feierabend and Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior 
Within Polities," 249-71. A similar inference is reached 
by Betty A. Nesvold, "A Scalogram Analysis of Political 
Violence," Comparative Political Studies, II (July, 1969), 
172-94.
^^Ted R. Gurr, "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," 
in The History of Violence in America. Report to the National 
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, ed. by 
Hugh Davis Graham and Ted R. Gurr (New York: Praeger, 1969),
p. 573.
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empires over a 25-century span and found that they averaged
only four peaceful years for each year in which there was a
12major incident of civil unrest. Similarly, Peter Calvert
found that a total of 367 revolutions occurred in all countries
during the historical time period between 1900 and 1965. This
13was an average of 5.56 a year for the 65-year period. In
the historical period between 1800 and 1960 William Flanigan
and Edwin Fogelman found that political violence was wide-
14spread in sixty-five countries studied.
Having discussed the definition of political insta­
bility and its ubiquitous nature we now explore studies 
relating first to the human dimensions, and then to cross­
national research on this subject.
Human Dimensions 
James C. Davies observes that;
Violence among men goes back to the beginnings of 
human history, when Cain slew his brother Abel and 
later asked the question: 'Am I my brother's keeper?'
Violence among citizens, of which revolution is the 
most extreme sort, probably goes as far back in the 
history of government. Indeed, it may be argued that 
violence of citizen against citizen, government against
12Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics.
Vol. Ill: Fluctuations of Social Relationships. War, and
Revolution (New YorKl American, 1937), pp. 383-506.
13Peter A. R. Calvert, "Revolution: The Politics
of Violence," Political Studies. XV, No. 1 (1967), 1.
14William H. Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Patterns 
of Political Violence in Comparative Historical Perspective}' 
Comparative Politics. Ill, No. 1 (October, 1970), 1-20.
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citizen, and citizen against government has always 
come before orderly political processes. . . . Men 
have always had the power to use violence against 
government; governments have always had the power 
to use violence against citizens. The question is 
not as to the power but as to the reasons people 
decide to exercise it.15
Explanations of fundamental causes of human behavior 
related to political consequences have been offered since 
Plato's Republic. This survey of the human dimensions of 
political instability will concentrate briefly on the class­
ical and historical reference.to this phenomenon and then 
take up the more recent developments of the social scientists' 
search for the fundamental causes of civil disorders and 
revolutions. We shall expect to find that the center of
emphasis is placed first on the human mind as the elemental
factor, then on the assertions that internal conflict 
behavior begins in group (economic, ethnic, or religious) 
conflict, and back again to the belief that violence and 
strife originate in the minds of men.
Aristotle notes a link between peoples' aspirations
and their tendency to revolt when they fail to attain them.^^ 
His study of man and society led him to believe that revolu­
tions occur from a failure of a society to realize equality. 
" . . .  it is the passion for equality which is thus at the 
root of sedition,
^^Davies, When Men Revolt, p. 3. 
l*Ibid.. p. 86.
^^Aristotle, Politics, cited in Ernest Baker, The 
Politics of Aristotle (London: Oxford University Press.
1452) ,  p'."7b?:-----------
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In 1776, when Jefferson premised the argument for
independence from British rule with the statement that
"all men are created equal," he was making an assertion
about man's nature. Men who have been denied equality have
been a major factor in all major revolutionary upheavals
since Luther posted his ninety-five theses on the Wittenberg
18church door; indeed, since long before that.
The identification of the inequalities of wealth and 
power by Machiavelli as a cause for the existence of civil 
strife comes closest to providing an operational theory of 
political violence as a control technique for governments 
and in recognizing both its strengths and weaknesses.
Violence was seen as an inherent part of the political pro­
cess, something governments could not avoid.
Machiavelli provides some theoretical and practical 
guides to government, but it was not until later in history 
that similar discourses became abundantly available to insur­
gents or revolutionaries. Engels, Marx, Lenin, Blanqui, 
Bakunin, Necaev, Sorel, and Fanon put out a stream of liter­
ature from the middle of the nineteenth century on. This 
later literature dealt almost exclusively with revolutionary 
violence and ways of capitalizing on the weaknesses of 
governments observed by Aristotle.
Max Weber provides an analysis which associates revo­
lution, violence, and other control techniques. He places
18Davies, When Men Revolt, p. 7.
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violence in the center of political action by defining the
state in terms of a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
19violence.
Most of the contemporary researchers of political 
violence base their analysis on individuals rather than on 
social aggregates. Their thesis is fundamentally a psycho­
logical one: political violence is more prone to occur when
a period of objective economic and social development is 
followed by a short period of sharp reversal. This effects 
a rapidly widening gap between gratifications (socio-economic 
or otherwise) which suddenly drop off while expectations 
(socio-economic or otherwise) continue to rise. Frustration 
resulting from economic or social dislocations is the most 
general cause of this widening gap of individual dissatis­
faction. People fear that the gains made in individual and 
collective satisfaction, obtained with great effort during
the past period of economic and social development, will be
20hopelessly lost; hence, their mood becomes violent.
Figure 1 shows Davies* interpretation of this idea. He 
supports this notion with evidence from Door's Rebellion, the 
Russian Revolution, and the Egyptian Revolution.
The theoretical foundations of the 'gap* between social 
expectation and social achievement which Davies documents - have 
19Edward W. Gude, "Political Violence in Venezuela: 
1958-1964," in When Men Revolt and Why, ed. by James C. Davies 
(New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 259-73.
90James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in 
When Men Revolt and Why, ed. by James C. Davies (New York:
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Figure 1. Need Satisfaction and Revolution
Source; James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolu­
tion," in When Men Revolt and Why, ed. by 
James C. Davies (New York: The Free Press,
1971), p. 135.
come to be known as the "relative deprivation theory." In
brief, the theory of relative deprivation maintains that social
strain and discontent are caused by a widening gap between
aspirations and achievements.
Leonard Berkowitz is of the belief that a person's
frustrations are more severe when the anticipated satisfactions
he expects to derive from a goal are not achieved. The phrase
"revolution ot rising expectations" refers to just this concep-
21tion of frustration. The demonstration effect that accompanies
21Daniel Lerner, "Modernizing Styles of Life: A Theory,"
in The passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle
East, ed. by Daniel Lerner (New York: Free Press, 1958), pp. 43-75.
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the acquisition of modern conveniences by some members of a
poverty-stricken group heightens expectations among all the
members. Frustrations follow for the less fortunate members,
not merely because they had previously been deprived of these
things; their frustrations arise only after they had begun to
hope. Privations in themselves are much less likely to elicit
22violence than is the destroying of hope.
Closely aligned to the relative deprivation theory as 
an explanation of domestic unrest is the concept of "social 
mobilization." This theory holds that a change in life styles 
of social relationships among people within a country leads to 
a personal destabilizing experience. In the words of the 
literature, a change in life style creates social tensions. 
Economic development is said to be a process of social mobil­
ization by which people are uprooted from their traditional ties
and ways of life and exposed to constantly changing social 
23conditions. Along these lines, Samuel Huntington categorizes 
the ways in which modernization tends to promote conflict among 
groups. As modernization proceeds, structural and qualitative 
changes occur in urbanization, education, and communication, 
leading to increased aspirations. When groups and individuals
22Leonard Berkowitz, "The Study of Urban Violence: Some
Implications of Laboratory Studies of Frustration and Aggression," 
in When Men Revolt and Why, ed. by James C. Davies (New York:
The Free Press, 1^71), pp. 181-87.
23Leila Hucko Fraser, "A Cross-National Analysis of 
Political Instability and Economic Development" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. University of Illinois, 1971), p. 8.
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try to satisfy these aspirations (increased demands), they often 
are stymied due to lack of resources available to society to meet 
these demands.Then, as Karl Deutsch notes, political insta­
bility is prone to occur as the increased number of mobilized
people cannot be assimilated into the modern sector in terms of
25employment, education, and other aspirations.
Other studies tend to support Huntington and Deutsch in 
their association of social mobilization with political insta­
bility through demands--capability reasoning. The same general
manner of reasoning can be found in the writings of Wilbert E.
9fi 97Moore and Arnold Feldman.
28 29 30Lerner, Lipset, and Outright suggest that the wealth
of a country determines its degree of political stability; that 
is, that an inverse relationship exists between economic develop­
ment and political instability.
^^Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Socie­
ties (New Haven: Yale University press, 196#), p. 54.
25Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Devel­
opment," American Political Science Review, LV. No. 3 (September, 
1961), 499:
26Wilbert E. Moore, "Industrialization and Social Change," 
in Industrialization and Society, ed. by Bert F. Hoselitz and 
Wilbert E. Moore (The Hague: Mouton Co., 1963), p. 349.
^^Arnold S. Feldman, "Violence and Volatility; The Like­
lihood of Revolution," in Internal War, ed. by Harry Eckstein 
(New York: The Free Press, l4#4), p. 116.
28Lerner, "Modernizing Styles of Life," pp. 43-75.
29Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democ­
racy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American
Political Science Review. LIII (March, 1959), 69-105.
^^Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: 
Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review, XXVIII 
(April, 1963), 253-64. -----------
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Additional research efforts linking economic conditions 
to political instability have been made, with contrary conclusions, 
Lyford Edwards notes that: "As a group experiences an improvement
in its living conditions of life^ it will also experience a rise 
in its level of desires . . . leading to dissatisfaction and 
rebellion.
Crane Brinton, in his analysis of the American, French,
Russian, and English Revolutions noted the commonality that their
32" . . . societies were on the upgrade economically. . . . "
Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky's findings for Latin
America support McBrayer's judgement for that region--an increase
in GNP per capita has a significant inverse relationship with
political instability. On the other hand, Tanter and Midlarsky
found that a significant positive relationship held for the Asian
33and African regions.
As an example of how these findings can be applied in 
analyzing contemporary conditions, we may now look at the devel­
opment problems of low-income countries. One problem is that of 
over-extending or over-selling development. The allegation that 
"anything we can do will be useful and will provide more than
31Lyford p. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago press, Ï9z?), cited by
McBrayer, "External Economic Linkages," p. 137.
32Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 250-64.
33Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolu­
tion," Journal of Conflict Resolution. XI (September, 1967), 277.
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they have now" may sometimes be true, but it may also raise 
expectations above realistic levels.
In the twentieth century a common rallying point for poli­
tical revolutions in the less developed countries is the question 
of inequality in land use and ownership. Davies contends that 
these factors determine a citizen's attitude toward his govern­
ment. If a citizen feels that there is unjust distribution, he
33will harbor feelings of hostility toward his government. This
36was so in the sixteenth-century German peasant revolt, the
eighteenth-century French Revolution, and the twentieth-century
37Russian and Cuban Revolutions. And today, late in the
twentieth century, land use and ownership remains a dominant
political issue for those nations with a substantial rural
population, which includes most of the nations of the world.
This question also is reflected in the urban areas since rents
and living conditions in the urban slums contribute to the
38explosive conditions prevailing there.
^^David C. Schwartz, "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior," 
in When Men Revolt and why, ed. by James C. Davies (New York:
The Free Press, 1971), p. 130.
3‘iDavies, When Men Revolt, p. 25.
The basis for the German peasant discontent in the early 
16th century that culminated in an unsuccessful rural revolt in 
in 1525 was not identical but similar to those that De Tocqueville 
later described as developing in France before its revolution in 
1789 and to those which Mao Tse-Tung and others emphasized in 
China before its great revolution. Davies, When Men Revolt, p. 25.
37For an excellent discussion of the Cuban Revolution see: 
Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development (2nd ed.: New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1^68), chT 34.
38Davies, When Men Revolt, p. 205.
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One of the first explicit attempts to come to grips with
man's relation to the soil and to correlate that relationship
with political violence has been through the efforts of Bruce 
39Russett, He reaches the tentative conclusion that there can
be much latitude in the distribution of land ownership without
producing political instability. The critical point is that if
those at the lower end of the distribution are unable to provide
for themselves and their families from the fruits of their labor,
40then political instability reaches a high point. At variance 
with this view is the experience of Mexico following the Revolu­
tion of 1910. The agrarian reform (ejido system) abolished the 
feudal arrangement of land ownership and redistributed an estimated 
one-quarter of all farm land and about one-half of all cultivated 
land.^^ Although the plots of land received by the ejidos were 
in most cases of sub-optimum size, nevertheless, the land was 
their own. In contrast to Russett's findings, the relative size 
of farms was less important than the question of ownership as 
the agrarian reform proved to be politically stabilizing.
Russett's latter point would also be dismissed by Eric Hoffer, 
who contends that the wretchedly poor have little energy for 
agitation for a better political system, even if they held much
39Bruce Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation
of Land Tenure to Politics," in When Men Revolt and Why, ed. by 
James C. Davies (New York: The Free Press, 1471), pp/206-13.
°̂ibid.
^^Eastin Nelson, The Economic Potential of Mexico, 1970- 
1975 (Santa Barbara: TEM^Ô. 1959). quoted in Higgins. Économie
Development, p. 637.
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hope that real improvement was possible. "There is thus a 
conservatism of the destitute," says Hoffer, "as profound as 
the conservatism of the privileged.
Russett has investigated still another interesting 
possibility--that equality may be related to the stability of 
a democratic r e g i m e . T h a t  is, it is highly unlikely that a 
nation with grossly unequal patterns of distribution of major 
sources of wealth, such as agricultural land, will have a 
consistently democratic government. Table 1 is a sixfold 
synopsis showing each of the countries in Russett's sample, 
classified after Lipset as a "stable democracy," an "unstable 
democracy," or a "dictatorship,"^^ and also listed as above or 
below the median for the Gini index of land inequality,The 
time period is 1945-1961.
^^Eric Hoffer, The True Believer; Thoughts on the Nature 
of Mass Movements (New York: The New American Library, 1951),
p. 17 and passimT
43Russett, "Inequality and Instability," p. 213.
44"Stable democracies" are defined as states that have been 
characterized by the uninterrupted continuation of political 
democracy since World War I, and the absence since that time of a 
totalitarian movement, either Fascist or Communist, which at any 
point received as much as twenty percent of the vote. "Unstable 
democracies" are countries which, although unable to meet the 
first criteria, nevertheless have a history of more or less free 
elections for most of the post-World War I period. "Dictator­
ships" are those countries in which, perhaps despite some demo­
cratic interludes, free elections have generally been absent. 
Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," pp. 73-74,
45The Gini index is a simple summary measure of the total 
inequality of a distribution. The Gini index for inequality in 
land distribution calculates over the whole population the differ­
ence between an "ideal" cumulative distribution of land (where all 
farms are the same size) and the actual distribution. The higher 
the Gini index, the greater the inequality.
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Table 1
STABLE DEMOCRACIES, UNSTABLE DEMOCRACIES, 
AND DICTATORSHIPS BY DEGREE OF INEQUALITY 
IN LAND DISTRIBUTION
GINI INDEX STABLE DEMOCRACIES UNSTABLE DEMOCRACIES DICTATORSHIPS
Greater Denmark Japan Yugoslavia
than Canada France Poland











West Germany S. Vietnam
Libya
Panama
Median New Zealand Austria Egypt
Equality Uruguay Greece Honduras

















Source : Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability; The 
Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," in When Men Revolt 
and Why, ed. by James C. Davies (New York: The Free 
Press, 1971), p. 213.
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The results lend credence to De Tocqueville’s basic 
observation that no state can long maintain a democratic form 
of government if the major sources of economic gain are divided 
too unequally among its citizens. Of the twenty-three states 
with the more equal pattern of land distribution (Greater than 
Median Equality) thirteen are stable democracies, whereas only 
three of the twenty-four countries with the more unequal distri­
bution of land can be classified as stable democracies. And, as 
Russett points out, each is a fairly rich state where agriculture 
is no longer the principal source of wealth.
The state of a nation's economic posture is the basis for 
much research and theory relative to political instability. In 
addition to the general theory of the gap between economic 
expectations and distribution as the source of political insta­
bility, James D. McBrayer, Jr. cites four expressive concepts of 
the relationship between economic development and political 
instability
(1) The Marxian view;
As a group experiences a worsening of its conditions 
of life, it will become increasingly dissatisfied until 
it eventually r e b e l s . 48
Russett, "Inequality and Instability," p. 213.
^^James D, McBrayer, Jr., "External Economic Linkages and 
Political Instability in Latin America : 1949-1969" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1972), p. 136.
48Cited by James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," 
American Sociological Review, XXVII, No. 1 (February, 1962), p. 5.
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(2) The Alexis De Toqueville statement:
In none of the decades immediately following the 
Revolution did our national prosperity make such rapid 
forward strides as in the two preceding it . , . this 
steadily increasing prosperity, far from tranquilizing 
the population, everywhere promoted a spirit of unrest.
. . . Thus it was precisely in those parts of France 
where there had been most improvement that popular 
discontent ran the highest. . . . For it is not always 
when things are going from bad to worse that revolution 
breaks out. On the contrary, it oftener happens that 
when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule 
over a long period without protest suddenly finds the 
government relaxing its pressure it takes up arms 
against it.49
(3) The Davies' hypothesis:
Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged 
period of objective economic and social development is 
followed by a short period ot sharp reversal. People then 
subjectively fear that ground gained with great effort 
will be quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary.50
(4) Davies' other concept:
Satisfied or apathetic people who are poor in goods, 
status, and power can remain politically quiet and their 
opposites can revolt, just as, correlatively and more 
probably, dissatisfied poor can revolt and satisfied rich 
oppose revolution. It is the dissatisfied state of mind 
rather than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 
'inadequate' supplies of food, equality, or liberty which 
’ produces the revolution.51
The second area of research to be reviewed in this chapter 
will be those studies which have attempted systematic empirical
A QAlexis De Toqueville, The Old Regime and the French 
Revolution, trans. by Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, New York; 
Doubleday and Co., 1955) quoted in When Men Revolt and Why, ed. 
by James C. Davies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 95, 97.
^^James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in 
When Men Revolt and Why, ed. by James C. Davies (New York: The
Free Press,l4)l), p. i$4.
S^Ibid., p. 136.
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analyses of political instability more or less broadly based in 
cross-national studies. The major emphasis will be given to 
those studies that investigate the association between economic 
development and political instability.
Cross-National Research 
Several social scientists have made systematic cross­
national comparisons of political instability. Their aim is to 
portray quantities of civil unrest and change for comparative 
analysis. Numerous studies might be mentioned, but this listing 
concentrates on some of the most important ones using a number 
of countries and several different variables.
One of the most ambitious undertakings to date is the
52Arthur Banks and Robert Textor study, A Cross-Polity Survey.
Their efforts represent a rating of 115 separate nations on 
57 different political and social characteristics. Tables are 
presented showing the degree of association between character­
istics (variables).
A unique element in the Cross-Polity Survey is that the 
authors have also presented "soft" judgmental variables like
interest articulation or the political role of the police, in
53contrast to typical studies such as Russett, et al. which rely 
exclusively on "hard" quantifiable variables like radios per
5?Arthur S. Banks and Robert Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey 
(Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963).
53Russett, World Handbook.
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1,000 population and votes for socialist parties as a percentage 
of total vote.
A similar approach to the Cross-Polity Survey is the work 
by Lyle W. S h a n n o n . H i s  analysis includes the creation of 
Guttman scales as well as simple indices of the correlacion 
between paired variables.
In a work that has raised almost as many questions as it 
has answered, the Feierabends make an elegant attempt to scale 
various kinds of instability--from labor strikes at one end, to 
assassinations to coups d'dtat and actual civil war at the 
o t h e r . I n  this study two major components of social research 
are combined: psychological theory, and the quantitative analysis
of aggregate data. The aggregate data are statistics mirroring 
various internal conditions of all the nations in the world. 
Included are data on such things as percentage levels of literacy, 
percentage of population living in urban centers, number of
telephones and doctors per capita, and on various kinds of
56instability events.
^^Lyle W. Shannon, "Socio-Economic Development and Political 
Status," Social Problems (Fall, 1959), pp. 157-69; "Is the Level 
of Development Related to Capacity for Self-Government?" The 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 17. No. 3 (1958), 
■3'67-8T:--------------------------------- ^
^^Feierabend and Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior Within 
Polities," pp. 229-49. The Feierabends' article contains a wealth 
of references to previous research on political instability.
^^Davies, When Men Revolt, pp. 228-29.
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Using a sample of thirty-six nations for a time period 
covering approximately one hundred years (1865-1966), Banks 
presents evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a 
general tendency for political stability, democratic performance, 
and modernization to vary positively, at least for the non­
communist nations, during essentially normal conditions of 
political life.^^
In a major work on the stability of democracy, Lipset
examined the characteristics for two groupings of national
political systems: stable and unstable democracies, and popular
and elite-based dictatorships for Western Europe and Latin America
over a 30-year period. The criteria were essentially the presence
or absence of free elections and the presence or absence of a
totalitarian movement, either fascist or communist, which at any
point during the period of study received as much as 20 percent
of the vote. The findings revealed for each region that a
relatively high level of economic development was associated
58with "stable democracies."
In conjunction with the above findings, Huntington agrees 
that there is a significant correlation between economic develop­
ment and political instability, but this relationship is dependent
59upon the "stage" of economic development.
^^Arthur S. Banks, "Modernization and Political Change:
The Latin Americans and Amer-European Nations," Comparative 
Political Studies. II, No. 4 (January, 1970), 405-18.
58Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 69-105.
^^Huntington, Political Order, p. 53.
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Along these lines, the studies of Almond and Verba^^
61 62 tend to support the theses of Huntington and Lipset, who
contend that the political climate necessary to support a demo­
cratic political system correlates with highly developed 
economic factors. Almond and Verba assert that:
. , . economic advance and a shift in the distribution
of the labor force toward a higher proportion of skilled, 
white-collar, technical, and managerial personnel may be 
accompanied by the development of a more competent citizenry 
. . . ^ând possibly/ , . . development of democratic
political participation. . . .63
Contrary to the above-mentioned views that economic 
abundance leads to political development in the form of democracy. 
Max Millikan denies any bases for such a relationship: " . . .
most scholars have little more than a priori reasoning to offer 
concerning the relationship between economic development and 
political development /^democracy/.Hans Morgenthau emphati­
cally denies such a relationship as he states that:
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963).
^^Huntington, Political Order, p. 53.
fi ?Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man; The Social Bases 
of Politics (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1^50), p. 64.
Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 345.
^^Max F. Millikan, "The Political Case for Economic 
Development," in Why Foreign Aid? ed. by Robert A. Goldwin 
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), p. 74.
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__ No necessary relationship exists between the two 
/economic development and democracy/. Recent history 
has made this clear. The most impressive example is 
the Soviet Union. Its rapid development has gone hand 
in hand with authoritarian government and a case could 
well be made for the proposition that the former would 
have been impossible without the latter.®^
Zbigniew Brezezinski and Huntington acknowledge the 
correlation between economic development and political insta­
bility but, citing the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as examples, 
contend that economic development affects political systems in
different ways, depending upon the society's present environment
fifiand past social history.
In a study mentioned earlier in this paper, Russett has 
applied multiple regression analysis in discriminating the 
effects of land variables and economic variables on political 
instability. His conclusion for tlie study of 47 countries was 
that inequality clearly is associated with political instability, 
especially when other influences such as per capita G.N.P. and 
the percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture are 
taken into account.
In Rudolph Rummel’s Dimensionality of Nations Project an 
attempt is made to include a wide variety of indices in a factor
^^Hans J. Morgenthau, "Preface to a Political Theory of 
Foreign Aid," in Why Foreign Aid? ed. by Robert A. Goldwin 
(Chicago: Rand McNally ana Co., 1963), p. 74.
^^Zbigniew Brezezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political 
Power: USA/USSR (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965), p. 40.
^^Russett, "Inequality and Instability," p. 213.
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analysis not limited to measures of economic development. One
study in this project has endeavored to identify patterns of
68domestic and international conflict. The technique of factor
analysis was also used by P. M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks to
investigate the characteristics of both developed and underde-
69veloped nations.
Peter and Anne Schneider have presented research which 
attempts to synthesize and test a series of hypotheses linking 
certain aspects of social change, political institutions, and 
economic development with political violence in ten of the 
world's more affluent nations for the time period 1948-68.^^
Their evidence seems to support the contention that violence 
results from changes occurring too rapidly for the institutions 
to handle and too rapidly given the extent of economic resources 
available to meet the increasing demands. A consequence of this 
study is that it demonstrates the feasibility of utilizing cross­
national data in the analysis of nations which tend to cluster 
on many statistical indicators, e.g., political violence or
68Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior 
Within and between Nations," General Systems. Yearbook of the 
Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, 1963.
^^P. M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political 
Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey." American
Political Science Review, LIX, No. 3 (1965;, 602-l4.
^^Peter R. Schneider and Anne L. Schneider, "Social 
Mobilization, Political Institutions, and Political Violence:
A Cross-National Analysis," Comparative Political Studies, IV,
NO. 1 (April, 1971), 69-90.
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economic development. However, the authors warn that the findings
should not be generalized to all nations, and particularly not to
those which are the least developed.
Nesvold has used a cross-national analysis of political
violence as it occurred in eighty-two nations during the period
1948-61 in an attempt to measure the amounts of social unrest
in a nation— including both violent events and those that were
71potentially violent. Her findings reveal that there is clearly 
the tendency for the most industrialized nations to be the most 
peaceful nations. As nations begin the ordeal of industrial­
ization, it is postulated, large numbers of people are attracted 
away from the rural environment to form a pool of labor for an 
expanding urban industrial base.
If these people find frustration and poverty rather than 
some of the gratifications of modernized society, one can 
expect to find a core of discontented persons who are living 
in close enough proximity so that collective expressions of 
this discontent are all too likely to occur. Furthermore, 
there is speculation in the literature that the paternalistic 
aspect of traditional society causes these new participants 
in modernity to look to the government as the agency with the 
power to dispense or withhold these sought-after benefits.72, 73
^^Nesvold, "Scalogram Analysis of Political Violence,"
172-94.
72lbid.. 181-82.
73The frequent occurrence of serious social tensions and 
social unrest in the early industrialization of a nation has been 
noted. See, for example, Phillip M. Hauser, "The Social, Economic, 
and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," and B. F. 
Hoselitz, "Main Concepts in the Analysis of the Social Implications 
of Technical Change," in Industrialization and Society, ed. by 
B. F. Hoselitz and W. E. Moore (Paris: UNESCO-Mouton, 1963),
pp. 211 and 12-13, respectively. See also W. E. Moore, "The 
Social Framework ot Economic Development," in Tradition. Values, 
and Socio-Economic Development, ed. by Ralph Braibanti and J. J. 
Spengler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961),
p. 71.
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In addition, Nesvold believes that the data verify a 
curvilinear pattern of relationships among those nations that 
are presently at different levels of development. Operationally, 
this means that the greatest amount ot violence occurs at the 
middle levels of development. Those groups of nations with the
highest and lowest GNP per capita and the highest and lowest
literacy rates are the most non-violent.
This same finding was noted by Russett, et al. (see
Figure 2) who suggests that in a traditional society knowledge
is limited, aspirations are limited, and expectations as to the
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Figure 2.
Source ;
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Economic Development is associated with Political 
Violence at Middle Stages of Development 
Bruce Russett, et al.. World Handbook of Political and 
Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press.m'zryr p."707:—
^^Russett, World Handbook, p. 307.
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This relationship was further elaborated in joint studies 
by the Feierabends and Nesvold. Using the generally-held notion 
that the more developed a society the more stable it will be, 
i.e., less domestic violence as the touchstone, the researchers 
compared eight indicators of the level ot development for the 
period 1948 through 1955 and the degree ot political stability 
for the period 1955 through 1961. The relationship produced no 
correlation below .79(N = 84).^^ The interpretation is that 
political stability in time period two is highly correlated with 
the level of development in time period one. Additionally, the 
authors came to the conclusion that modern and traditional 
societies tend toward stability, while the transition to modern­
ization leads to political instability and v i o l e n c e . I n  the 
words of the authors:
The arousal of an underdeveloped society to awareness of 
complex modern patterns of behavior and organization brings 
with it a desire to emulate and achieve the same high level 
of satisfaction. But there is an inevitable lag between 
aspiration and achievement. . . .  It is postulated that the 
peak discrepancy between systematic goals and their satis­
faction, and hence maximum systematic frustration, is likely 
to occur during the transitional phase.A/
^^Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend, and Betty Nesvold, 
"Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns,"
in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspective,
ed. by Ted Gurr and Hugh Graham (Washington, D.C.: National Com-
mission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969), pp. 648-88; 
IVO K. Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend, and Betty Nesvold, 
"Correlates of Political Stability," Paper presented at the 1963 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
September 4-7, 1963.
^^Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Social Change and 
Political Violence," pp. 670-76.
^^Ibid., p. 647.
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Figure 3 depicts the increasing and decreasing gaps 







STAGE OF MODERNIZATION STAGE
Figure 3. Model of Uneven Growth of Modern
Aspirations and Achievement During 
Transition.
Source: Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold,
"Social Change and Political Violence," 
p. 647.
The modernization process, which has been most rapid 
in the modernizing states of the twentieth century, is placing 
a great burden upon the political and social systems of these 
societies. Huntington points out the findings of Karl Deutsch 
that during the nineteenth century the " . . .  principal 
indicators of social mobilization in modernizing countries 
changed at about the rate of 0.1 percent per year, while 
in twentieth-century modernizing countries they changed at
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about the rate of 1.0 percent per year." That is a tenfold
increase in the rate of modernization in the twentieth century
78as compared to the nineteenth.
The relationship between economic development and political 
stability lacks a consensus among researchers as to the interpre­
tation of the findings. It is reported in one study of 134 
countries for the period 1958 to 1965 that violent conflicts 
were more than four times as prevalent in the least developed 
countries (with an annual per-capita income of less than 100 
dollars) as they were in the highly developed countries (with 
an annual per-capita income of greater than 750 dollars).And 
in a speech delivered at Montreal, Canada, World Bank President 
Robert McNamara made note of the relationship between development 
and political stability;
There exists a direct and constant proportion between 
the annual number of upheavals--which in the years between 
1958 and 1966 has almost doubled— and the economic develop­
ment of the countries involved. Out of the twenty-seven 
highly developed countries (with an annual per-capita income 
of greater than 750 dollars) only one has suffered a major 
upheaval since 1958; out of the thirty-eight least developed 
countries (with an annual per-capita income of less than 
100 dollars) thirty-two suffered outbursts of violence 
during this period. Eighty-seven percent of the least 
developed, 69 percent of the underdeveloped, and 48 percent 
of the haIf-developed countries have suffered this fate. But 
out of the 148 revolutions during this eight-year period only
78Huntington, Political Order and Changing Societies, 
pp. 45-47.
79 U.S. Department of Defense and Escott Reid, The Future 
of the World Bank (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 1965), pp. 64-70.
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fifty-eight were directly-related to Communist 
activity, and of these no less than seven were 
directed against Communism.
Substantiating these findings, Tanter found, in a study of 
seventy nations for the years 1955 through 1960, a correla­
tion of -.56 between per-capita GNP and the number of
1 *-• 81 revolutions.
Corroborating evidence has been obtained by Flanigan 
and Fogelman in a study of sixty-five countries from 1800 
to 1960, Their research revealed a consistently inverse
relationship between political instability and rates of
82development. This casts doubt on the findings that rapid
development is an instigator of political unrest and suggests 
that rapid development and political stability occur simul-
QOtaneously.
As can be seen, an extensive literature is available 
concerning the relationship between economic development and 
political instability. Although there are conflicting views
80Robert McNamara, speech delivered to the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors on May 18, 1966 at Montreal, 
Canada. Quoted in Arend Theodoor van Leeuwen, Development 
Through Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons,i9787?-pp.-n?:wr
81Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior 
Within Nations, 1958-1960," Journal of Conflict Resolution. X, 
No. 1 (March, 1966), 41-65.




as to whether economic development has a negative, or 
positive, or no effect at all on political stability, the 
point of thrust for almost all research efforts has been 
to consider the political system as being acted upon by 
economic conditions and not vice-versa. Many scholars who 
are interested in economic and/or political development 
merely assume that political stability is a necessary con­
dition for economic development. Very little empirical 
work has been done to test this hypothesized relationship.
Most notable among the scant number of research 
efforts have been the following.
Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris present a major 
study, its purpose being to focus upon the dynamics of the 
development process through the interaction of specific 
economic and non-economic variables. Seventy-four under­
developed countries were classified with regard to forty-one 
indicators of socio-political and economic performance for 
the period 1957-62. The countries were arranged into three 
groupings based on the level of socio-economic development 
attained, and then factor-analyzed. Political instability 
was found to have its most debilitating effect at the inter­
mediate level. By and large, this level is characterized by 
rapid social change, but progress has been strikingly uneven. 
As a result, while the previous equilibrium of the social 
structure has been shattered, the typical society at this 
level has been unable to reach a new equilibrium. A major
34
consequence of the condition ot dis-equilibrium that now exists 
is extreme social tension reflected in a persistent lack of 
national integration, intermittent outbreaks of violence, and 
marked political instability. And, since long-term investment 
and thus continuous growth require reasonable stability of the 
political framework, the authors conclude that one of the crucial 




Albert Hirshman and Barbara Ward contend that poli­
tical stability is a prerequisite to economic development.
87 88Simon Kuznets and Charles Wolfe, Jr. also maintain that a
stable political system is a necessary condition of economic
development. Peter T. Bauer and Basil S. Yamey see a steady
political system in which the maintenance of law and order is
one of the "minimum tasks" of the government which are " . . .
of vital importance for economic growth and generally a necessary
89condition for such growth."
^^Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society. Politics.
and Economic Development; A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore;
The John Hopkins Press, 1^71)/
85Albert 0, Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Develop­
ment (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1958.
86Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations
(New York; W. W. Norton and Company, 1958).
87Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth (New Haven;
Yale University Press, l966), pp. 450-55.
®®Charles Wolfe, Jr., The United States and the Third 
World (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 42-43.
89Peter T. Bauer and Basil S. Yamey, The Economics of 
Underdeveloped Countries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[9571, p. 163'.---------
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Claudio Velized confirms that political stability is a
prerequisite for economic development in Latin America. The
principal problem in Latin America is the "stability" of the
90political system, i.e., the rule of the oligarchy. Velized
is not alone in linking political stability with economic
development in Latin America. Said and Collier feel that:
"The basic assumption of United States policy for Latin America
. . . /Ts/ that political stability is the most important
91prerequisite for development. . . . "
Similarly, Pye is of the belief that:
Stability is legitimately linked with the concept of 
development, in that any form of economic and social advance­
ment does generally depend upon an environment in which 
uncertainty has been reduced and planning based on reasonably 
safe predictions is possible.92
In a second imaginative effort that bears some affinity
to their previously-mentioned research, Adelman and Morris again
seek to quantify non-economic variables that are thought to be
significant in the economic development equation. Their stated
purpose was to build an econometric model of socio-economic and
political change for the less-developed countries which would
give a statistical explanation of the economic and non-economic
forces which directly and indirectly determine a country's
90Claudio Velized, Obstacles to Change in Latin America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, l965), p. 1.
91Abdul A. Said and Daniel N. Collier, Revolutionism 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 85.
92Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), pp. 41-42.
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capacity for economic development. Of the variables (ranked in
order of importance) that were found to produce the greatest
change with respect to development potential, the majority of
the ones above the median are non-economic in nature. The only
political factor to have a significant impact is the extent of
93leadership commitment to economic development.
A final proposition ot Adelman and Morris concerning the 
relationship between political stability and economic develop­
ment should be noted. In their view the continued presence ot 
extreme social tensions, accompanied by frequent outbreaks ot 
violence, inevitably hampers economic development because of its 
adverse effects in the economic sphere on risk-taking activities 
and therefore on investment. It is expected that the adverse 
effects would be diffused throughout society to the point where 
feelings of indecision and hesitation color the outlook toward
economic activity of even those who participate only peripher­
alally in market transactions.
As a point in fact, the political instability that 
characterized Greece during 1944-1948 was a factor in the adverse 
expectations and low public confidence in the Government's 
monetary reforms. Consequently, the public did not deposit any
93 Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, "An Econometric 
Model of Socio-Economic and Political Change in Underdeveloped 
Countries." American Economic Review. LVIII, No. 5 (December, 
1968), pp. 1134-1214.
^^Adelman and Morris, Society. Politics, and Economic 
Development, pp. 45, 267.
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great portion of their savings with the commercial banks, lead­
ing to a shortage of private savings for economic reconstruction
95and development.
Conclus ion
From the contradictory findings which have been examined 
one may assert that economic development and political stability/ 
instability are related. However, as previously noted, there is 
no consensus as to the nature of the relationship between economic 
development and political instability or as to whether economic 
development or political stability is the prerequisite of the 
other. The variety of opinions and results of the many studies 
concerning this relationship indicate the complexity of the 
association.
The above-mentioned contradictions in research findings 
provide an initial stimulus to delve further into this topic.
The quantitative analysis presented in Chapter V is designed to 
provide a clarification to the previously discussed contradictions 
and to suggest the type of research which is now becoming possible 
from the available data. Most current quantitative research con­
cerning the relationship between economic development and 
political instability utilizes some type of cross-national 
analysis. This approach, however, does not move toward the 
insights that can be drawn from a more complete study of the 
subject by the use of individual country analyses.
95Alexander J. Kondonassis, "Monetary Policies of the Bank 
of Greece, 1949-1951; Contributions to Monetary Stability and 
Economic Development," Norman, Oklahoma, 1964, pp. 22, 156. 
(Mimeographed.)
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As a society transforms from tribalism to seIf-sustained
economic growth, the interwoven political, social, and economic
strnds of the social fabric change their patterns and their 
96relationships. Consequently, it is important to grasp the 
history and culture of a society in order to make judgements as 
to how empirically observed phenomena are related to the environ­
ment from which they have been extracted. In an attempt to 
provide an environment for the quantitative research in 
Chapter V, Chapters III and IV include an analysis of the poli­
tical, social, and economic history of each of the seventeen 
countries under study.
^^Adelman and Morris, Society, Politics, and Economic 
Development, p. 266.
CHAPTER III 
EUROPEAN NATIONS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
Introduction
In 1945 the future for most of the countries described 
in this chapter was as bleak as their cities and countrysides 
which lay in waste from the ravages of war. Events since 1945 
have belied the profound pessimism that existed then. The 
economic recovery has resulted in an era of prosperity and 
well-being, somewhat unique in European history. With the 
exception of Albania and scattered pockets of poverty elsewhere, 
the prosperity is not limited to a relatively small section of 
the population as it was so often in the past. The welfare 
state and the spread of higher education have made it possible 
for increasingly large sections of the population to become 
active participants in the modern technological societies. The 
prosperity is marred somewhat by persistent inflation. Infla­
tionary policy is hampered by the attitude that inflation is 
preferred to joblessness. Other aspects of the problem of 
inflation concern the structure of European industry with its 
hosts of small undercapitalized firms and the difficulty of 
shedding unwanted labor.
The discussion in this chapter and also in Chapter IV 
brings out opposed elements common to all the nation-states:
39
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first, that they are bound to act in concert in a large number 
of fields because their interests are complementary, and, 
secondly, that their national structures impose limitations on 
their joint action which are detrimental to their prosperity 
and progress.^ What these countries— with the exception of 
Albania--have been seeking since the war is to find a method or 
methods of resolving this contradiction. An intelligent and 
constructive movement in this direction is the formation of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Indeed, the presence of 
the EEC is felt in the formulation of nearly every major decision 
made by the countries discussed in this chapter. The institu­
tional framework of the EEC is needed because without it the 
long-term advantages of integration— stability, a large market, 
a more rational use of resources, greater opportunities for 
political and economic growth--will never be realized. The
interdependence of the nations involved necessitates such an
2institutional arrangement.
In spite of all the talk of unity, Europeans have not 
yet overcome the persistence of myriad old tribal and regional 
interests and loyalties lying within and across the national 
frontiers. In Yugoslavia, recent outbreaks of Croatian nation­
alism mark her as the only European nation whose existence as a 
single, unified state seems directly imperiled. But others
^John Calmann, ed., Western Europe: A Handbook (New York;
Praeger, 1967), p. xvi.
^Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii.
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have been shaken, to a greater or lesser degree, by unhappy 
minorities: France's Bretons and Corsicans, Spain's Basques,
and the numerous ethnic groups of Italy--the German- and French- 
speaking pockets in the north and the Sicilians and Sardinians 
in the arid mezzogiorno (southland).
The re-emergence of minority problems is partly due to 
the removal of the kind of external dangers that justify strong 
central government. Another factor is the advance of modern 
communications which has brought the threat of cultural homo­
genization much closer to many once-isolated peoples. The 
result is that such communities have renewed their insistence 
on maintaining their own languages, their own traditions and--
3all too often--their own archaic rivalries. It is the Italian 
sociologist Francesco Ferrarotti maintains, "The greatest single
4non-unifying factor in Europe is an excess of history," The 
danger of such increasingly violent unrest is that it could 
impair relations between nations and thus slow down the pace of 
European integration.
The biggest political question marks concern France and 
Italy. The fear is that a future Socialist-Communist victory 
in France could also enhance the opportunities of the large, 
disciplined Communist party in Italy, a country with a chaotic 
political life. From all indications, Greece is on the threshold
^"The Year of Europe," Time, March 12, 1973, pp. 36-43. 
^Ibid.. p. 43.
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of the return to a democratic form of government. It remains 
to be seen, however, whether the present political stability 
can be maintained in a democracy. The dictatorial nature of 
Spain, Yugoslavia, and Albania places them outside the periphery 
of European politics. The tiny nations of Malta and Cyprus are 
troubled by relations with England and by the question of 
national identification, respectively.
A more in-depth analysis will now be made of the major 
problems that have been highlighted by this introduction;
SPAIN
Spain, in southwest Europe, forms more than four-fifths 
of the Iberian peninsula. The Spanish people tend to reflect 
strong regional differences due to the country's historical 
development and the mountainous terrain, which help isolate 
one part of the country from another.^
The Republicans, taking advantage of the overwhelming 
majority they had won in parliamentary elections in early 
1931, proclaimed the Second Spanish Republic. The Republic, 
which attempted liberal reforms, was unpopular with the 
Roman Catholic Church and the aristocracy. General dissatis­
faction with the Republic increased as Spain began to feel 
the impact of the economic Depression of the 1930s. The 
army, the monarchists, the land-owning aristocracy, and the 
Church were united in their opposition to the Republic which 
was subscribed to by the socialists, communists, republicans, 
and various liberal groups.
Following a Republican victory in elections held in 
1936, a military rising led by General Francisco Franco 
precipitated a three-year civil war confronting his National­
ists against the Loyalists, as the supporters of the government 
were called. The Loyalists were aided by sympathizers in the
^Charles E. Nowell, "Spain," Cowles Encyclopedia of 
Nations, 1968, p. 175. The Basques, the inhabitants of the 
Western Pyrenees on the Bay of Biscay, have historically . 
advocated separation from Spain for an autonomous nation.
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United States and other countries as well as the Soviet Union. 
Franco, however, received large-scale aid from Nazi Germany 
and Fascist Italy, and by 1939 the Loyalists were defeated.
A fascist-type regime was established in Spain in which 
Franco still governs as Chief of State, Head of Government, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and head of the 
National Movement (the only legal political organization in 
Spain).̂  ’ ^
The political stability since 1939 is unique in recent
Q
Spanish history, which has been marked by great turmoil.
The basic problems in current Spanish affairs 
arise from the need for a further adaptation of 
the country's political institutions and practices 
as it moves away from the period of civil war and 
dictatorship and approaches the threshold of the 
post-Franco era. Pressures for change and contrary 
pressures for maintenance of the status quo are «
evident in virtually every sector o£ Spanish life. . . .
Since 1959, when economic reforms removed many of the
controls which had existed on trade and investment, the Spanish
economy has made rapid growth. The economy showed a real
^Nowell, "Spain," p. 177; "Spain," Political Handbook 
and Atlas of the World. 1970, ed. by Richard P. Stebbins and 
Alba Amoia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 320;
U.S. Department of State, Spain. Background Notes Series 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 1.
^General Franco's designation of Prince Juan Carlos 
has resolved part of the problem facing Spain as to who shall 
become the 79-year-old dictator's successor.
Q
U.S. Department of State, Spain, p. 3.
^"Spain," Political Handbook and Atlas of the World,
p. 321.
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growth of 7.5 percent in 1972 and is expected to maintain
at least a 7 percent growth rate through 1973. About 32
million tourists brought in $2.1 billion in 1972, helping
to push gold and foreign-currency reserves over $5 billion,
up from $1.7 billion in 1970.^^ Foreigners, their capital,
and the resulting industry have swept into Spain, giving
her the fastest industrial growth rate among major Free
World nations But this rapid growth is also causing
problems for Spain. The 8.3 percent inflation rate in 1972
was one of Europe's highest. One of the advantages to
foreign investors has been the supply of cheap labor, but
wages rose 15 percent in Spain in 1972 and are expected to
spurt again in 1973. Also, the work force is showing signs
of discontent under a rigid system of government controls.
The dynamics of rising expectations have been created and
12the government is under pressure to meet it.
Spain continues to be on the outside of the EEC-EFTA 
trading bloc and looking longingly inside. She has been 
actively engaged in trying to negotiate a new agreement 
with the EEC that would replace their present preferential
^^Neil Ulman, "Foreign Industry Pours into Spain, 
Spurring Rapid Growth Accompanied by Growing Pains.," Wall 
Street Journal. April 27, 1^3, p. 26. Spain now has the 
lOth-largest stock of gold and foreign-currency reserves 
in the world.
^̂ Ibid.
1 2Ibid. In addition, the territorial dispute with 
England over Gibraltar continues as an embroiled issue for 
the Spanish government.
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arrangement which became effective on October 1, 1970. Although 
the agreement fell short of Spain's expectations, it was in con­
formity with her general objectives toward westernizing the 
economy. In essence, the agreement is a six-year trade prefer­
ence pact which is anticipated to affect favorably 95 percent 
of Spain's industrial and 62 percent of her agricultural exports 
to the EEC. In return, Spain agreed to give preferential treat­
ment to about 61 percent of EEC exports to Spain. Statements 
made by leading European statesmen have indicated that Spain 
would only be welcomed into the Community when and if its
13political structures were in harmony with those of the Community.
13Alexander J. Kondonassis, "The EEC and Her Association 
with Israel, Spain, Turkey, and Greece." (Distinguished Lecture 
Series No, 3, Department of Economics, The Graduate School of 
Business, The University of Alabama, 1972), pp. 3-4.
FRANCE
The Republic of France, being the largest country 
in Western Europe, has one of Europe's most homogeneous 
populations. Due to the strong feeling of cultural unity 
in France, she has experienced very little expressions of 
minority unrest.
France occupies a central position in Western Europe 
and for centuries has played a leading role in European 
affairs. Also, the intellectual and cultural life of France 
has had an outstanding influence on other countries.
France emerged from World War II in 1944 in a state 
of virtual exhaustion, after four years of German occupation 
and government by the Vichy r e g i m e . T h e  French were 
liberated in August, 1944 by Allied forces, which included 
contingents of the French Committee of National Liberation 
(the Free French) under General Charles de Gaulle.During 
the immediate post-liberation period de Gaulle presided over 
a provisional government, but resigned in 1946 because of 
communist and socialist opposition to a constitution pro­
viding for a strong executive branch. The Fourth French
14James A. Leith, "France," Cowles Encyclopedia of 
Nations. 1968, p. 64.
^^Northwestern France was occupied by the Germans. In 
the southeast the Germans set up a puppet government headed by 
Marshall Henri-Philippe Pé’tain, which was known as the Vichy 
regime after the town that was its capital.
^^Leith, "France," pp. 70-71.
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Republic was then established under a new constitution with 
a parliamentary form of government controlled by a coalition 
of communists, socialists, and members of the MRP (the 
Catholic Popular Republican Movement).Twenty-six cabinets 
were formed during the life of the Fourth Republic, which 
came to an end in 1958 over the Algerian question and the 
threat of civil war facing the country.
Invited by Parliament to form a government and prevent 
incipient civil war, de Gaulle became Prime Minister in 
June, 1958 and the Fifth Republic came into being with his 
election as President in December, During the first decade 
of the Fifth Republic France enjoyed political stability and 
prosperity and played an ambitious role in foreign affairs.
De Gaulle labored to build France into a major power free 
from the constraint or influence of other nations, particularly 
the United States, and foreign policy was directed toward 
that end.
Having survived student and industrial unrest in 1968, 
which forced economic and educational reform upon the govern­
ment, de Gaulle resigned on April 27, 1969.,̂ ®
Under de Gaulle, France, as well as being a 
leader of the EEC, became a nuclear power and 
followed an independent policy with ré^frd to the 
United States and the Soviet Union, The era of 
de Gaulle was to a large extent an assertion of
Leith, "France," p, 70; U.S. Department of State, 
France. Background Notes Series (Washington, D,C.: Government
Printing Office, 1971), p, 3,
^Leith, "France," p, 70,
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France's Great Power status and national prestige.
His death in 1970 was deeply mourned.19
George Pompidou was elected President of the Republic 
in June, 1969. The government has maintained a large Parlia­
mentary majority, until the last elections in March, 1973, 
with two other parties as coalition partners of the Gaullist 
UDR, and has gradually transferred the political allegiance 
of Gaullists from their former exceptional leader to the 
support of a more traditionally-based political party.
The Pompidou government has continued to follow the inde­
pendent policy that was launched by de Gaulle, while main­
taining close economic relations with her allies and playing 
a leading role in European affairs. The opposition parties 
of the left and center have combined their electoral forces 
and thus represent an ominous political challenge to the 
present government.
France is still Western Europe's leading agricultural 
country, with more than three-fourths of its area under
cultivation, although agriculture has lost its dominant place
21in the economy.^ Since World War II French industry has 
expanded most rapidly. At present France has the fastest 
growing economy in Europe and is expected to surpass
1 Q"France," Europa 1972. I (16th ed.; London;
Europa Publications Limited, 1972), p. 678.
2°Ibid.
21French agriculture is characterized by outdated 
techniques and low productivity.
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West Germany in industrial output by 1980, Industrial 
expansion is being aided by a high level of public 
investment in services, amenities and regional develop­
ment, and by reforms of working practices in many industrial
concerns.22) 23
Strong governmental direction of the economy under 
a series of formal development plans (indicative planning) 
also have contributed greatly to France’s economic growth.
The plans involve close cooperation between government and 
private business and have been successful in channeling 
resources and balancing economic growth.
Despite recurrent industrial relations problems in 
many sectors and nagging inflationary pressures arising 
from the full-capacity economy, the overall outlook for the 
French economy is excellent. Real GNP is expanding; new 
entrants to the labor market are being absorbed; the 
balance of payments presents a strong posture with French 
exports in a sound competitive position; and the economy 
has the expected strength to withstand the impact of an 
enlarged EEC.^^
22|iprance," Europa Year Book. 1972. p. 679.
23A structural problem hampering the French economy is 
the existence of a host of small, undercapitalized companies. 
Out of 908,000 firms, only 37 employ more than 5,000 people, 
and only 140 more than 2,000. "The Year of Europe - The 
Economy," Time Magazine. March 12, 1973, p. 51.
2^u.S. Department of Commerce, France. Foreign Economic 
Trends and Their Implications for the United States Series 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 3.
Among the seventeen Mediterranean nations only France and Italy 
are full members of the EEC. This places the other nations at 
a disadvantage in trade relations with the EEC.
ITALY
Italy is a 700-mile-long peninsula extending into 
the heart of the Mediterranean Sea. Modern Italian history 
dates from 1870 when the entire peninsula was unified under 
the House of Savoy. Italy fought with the Allies in World 
War 1 but yielded in 1922 to the Fascist dictatorship of 
Benito Mussolini who, in the course of a few years, elimin­
ated the old political parties, curtailed personal liberties,
2 Sand installed a Fascist dictatorship, the Corporate State.
Italy entered World War 11 on the side of Nazi Germany 
and switched to the Allies side only after Mussolini's 
removal from office in 1943. Following a period of pro­
visional government, the monarchy ended in a plebiscite in
1946, and a Constituent Assembly prepared the republican
2 6constitution for the present Republic. Since the war the 
Christian Democratic Party has dominated a succession of 
coalition governments.
2 5U.S. Department of State, Italy. Background Notes 
eries (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970),
9 f t  — J"Italy," The Europa Year Book. 1972, 1 (16th ed.; 





The present existence of nine major political
parties and a number of minor ones can be traced back to
the continuing secessions of Italian governments and their
27accompanying political instability. Discontent and nation­
wide unrest have resulted, as it is difficult for a government 
in power to reach agreements on specific issues when it must 
represent a wide range of views.
Throughout 1968 students organized strikes and 
demonstrations in favor of university reform, while workers 
struck nation-wide demanding higher pensions and the abolition
of zonal wage differentials. Strikes and labor unrest have
28continued since 1968, mainly in support of social reform.
Italy has essentially a private enterprise economy
although state-owned enterprises account for approximately
29half the total national industrial investment. Many 
Italians work abroad and their remittances form a valuable 
source of income as do the receipts from tourism. As a 
reflection of the political instability in the last few years,
27 Italy has the strongest political Communist party 
not in power in Europe. There is also an extreme right 
party (Neo-Fascists) of considerable strength holding seats 




'Italy," The Europa Year Book. 1972. p. 895.
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Italy has been faced with severe inflation and stagnation.^® 
Wage increases in 1969, totaling approximately 20 percent, 
were not offset by improved productivity, and as a result 
more than a million Italians were unemployed in Autumn, 1971. 
However, the government's measures to increase industrial 
activity (renewed public investment in building, improved 
credit facilities, and tax incentives for expansion) have 
definitely given an expansionary impetus to the economy.
The predicted growth of GNP in real terms in 1972 was 3.5 
percent, with industrial production up 4 percent. Initial 
expectations for 1973 are for GNP growth in real terms in 
excess of 5 percent.
Italy's long-term economic problem remains that of 
the integration of Southern Italy, including Sicily, with 
the more industrially-developed North. The income per 
capita of the Southern population is just over half that of 
the country as a whole, while employment and production lag 
far behind, despite the efforts of the Cassa per il 
Hezzogiorno (the state funds to develop Southern Italy)
30The uncertain political and economic climate is the 
overriding factor in explaining Italy's weak investment 
activity. U.S. Department of Commerce, Italy. Economic Trends 
and Their Implications for the United States Series (Washing­
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 5.
31Ibid.. pp. 4-5; "Italy," Europa Year Book. 1972. 
pp. 895-951
YUGOSLAVIA
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a
nation at the western edge of the Balkan peninsula in
southern Europe, is a federal union whose population has
the greatest ethnic and religious diversity in Eastern
Europe, an area noted for such diversity.
Following the struggle of the National Liberation
Army (Partisans), led by Marshall Tito and the Communist
Party against the German occupation during World War II,
the Monarchy was abolished and a Republic set up in 1945
32under the leadership of Marshall Tito. On January 31, 
1946, a Soviet-type constitution was adopted, and
qoYugoslavia officially became a "people's republic."
During the immediate post-war period Yugoslavia was 
a firm supporter of the Soviet. Union. But in June, 1948 
the U.S.S.R. made public its strong disapproval of policies 
and practices in Yugoslavia. The issue was whether Yugo­
slavia could remain in the Soviet bloc while pursuing
Yugoslavia," The Europa Year Book. 1972. I 
(16th ed.; London: Europa Publications Limited, 1972),
p. 1420.
33U.S. Department of State, Yugoslavia. Background 




policies decided upon by its own leaders instead of by
Moscow. Stalin decided this degree of independence was
unacceptable, and Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet-
dominated Cominform, an organization of Communist-bloc
countries. This expulsion was followed by an unsuccessful
Cominform campaign to subvert the Tito government and
34replace it with a regime subservient to Moscow. ,
Subsequent to 1948 Yugoslav foreign policy underwent
a sharp change. Inasmuch as the Soviet-bloc countries had
broken economic as well as political ties with her, the
country was forced to direct its foreign trade to the West
and to neutral countries. At the same time, she began to
receive economic and military assistance from the United
States and formed political, cultural, and economic ties
35with the countries of Western Europe. Following the death 
of Stalin in 1953 Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet 
Union were normalized, but have since been subjected to 
periodical strain, as at the time of the Soviet-led invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, when Yugoslavia was prompt 
and forthright in its condemnations of Soviet actions and 
took active measures to strengthen her own defenses. The
34U.S. Department of State, Yugoslavia. p. 3.
35Robert F. Byrnes and George Kish, "Yugoslavia," 
Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968. p. 217. There is 
considerable foreign investment in Yugoslavia ensuing from 
active encouragement by the government.
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Yugoslavs were quite emphatic in their disapproval of the
Soviet doctrine of "limited sovereignty" within the Socialist
"commonwealth." Each country, so the Yugoslavs maintain,
should search for its own distinctive "road to socialism" in
36internal policies.
The Constitution of 1963 and subsequent amendments 
have brought about a deliberate decentralization of power 
from the Federation to the Constituent Republics. Consti­
tutional amendments adopted in June, 1971 led to the
formation of a collective Presidency which will eventually
37succeed President Tito. However, this legislation has
failed to temper the outburst of Croat nationalism which
erupted twice in 1971 in protest against the proportion of
the country's wealth which was being redistributed to Serbia.
There followed demands from other republics for greater
autonomy. In December, 1971 the regime applied strict
measures to bring the situation under control, including
a purge of political and student leaders, teachers, and 
38writers.
Prior to World War II the Yugoslav economy was based 
on agriculture and mining. During the post-war period,
36U.S. Department of State, Yugoslavia. p. 3.
37The question of secession is perhaps Yugoslavia's 
most pressing problem. There is no recognized personality 
to replace Tito.
^^'YugoslaviaEuropa Year Book, 1972, pp. 1420.
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however, the industrial sector has come to the forefront 
under the direction of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which 
had come to power during the war.
In 1950, Yugoslavia began a far-reaching program of 
experimentation with workers' self-management, decentral­
ization of investment decisions, and freer markets, while
39retaining social ownership of capital goods. Forced 
collectivization in agriculture was tried and abandoned in 
the immediate post-war period when it became apparent that 
much of the mountainous country was not suited to extensive 
cultivation. Collective farms do exist, but about 80 percent 
of the country's arable land is privately owned.
During the 1950s and early 1960s Yugoslavia enjoyed 
a high rate of economic growth, and industrialization of 
the country proceeded. Neither process, however, solved 
the persistent balance-of-payments problem or leveled out 
the sharp regional contrasts, as, for instance, between 
highly developed Slovenia and Croatia and backward Macedonia 
and Montenegro.
In 1965 Yugoslavia embarked on a program of economic 
reform to convert an essentially command-type, centrally- 
controlled economy into a more market-oriented, Western-style 
economy. The immediate effect of the reform internally, was
39U.S. Department of State, Yugoslavia. p. 5.
^^Byrnes, "Yugoslavia," p. 215.
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a rapid rise in prices and in unemployment. Externally, the 
country experienced a sharp rise in imports and a growth in the 
visible trade deficit, partly offset by an increase in invisible 
r e c e i p t s . A  stabilization program was initiated in November, 
1970 to counter inflation and reduce the trade deficit. Another 
measure to strengthen the balance of payments was the devaluation 
of the ’dinar’ in January, 1971. Nevertheless, inflation and 
balance-of-payments deficits continue to be a troublesome problem.
In March, 1970, Yugoslavia became the first communist 
country to conclude a non-preference trade agreement (based on 
the most-favored nation clause) with the EEC, one of her most 
important trading partners.
Despite the conditions prevalent in Yugoslavia she has 
enjoyed a considerably higher standard of consumer welfare than 
other communist states as well as a decidedly higher degree of 
personal freedom.
41At present Tourism is very important as a source of 
foreign currency and has great potential in the future. Parti­
cularly appealing is the unspoiled beauty of the Dalmatian coast 
on the Adriatic Sea.
Yugoslavia,” Europa Year Book. 1972, pp. 1420-21.
ALBANIA
Albania is a small Communist nation in southeastern 
Europe. The majority of the rapidly growing population is 
Albanian, but there is a significant Greek and Slavic 
minority in the country. There is virtually no formal 
practice of the previously predominant Islamic religion due 
to government restrictions. In 1967 the government undertook 
an accelerated campaign to eradicate religious thoughts and 
beliefs
Central planning is the guiding force for economic 
activity. The government has sought to transform the 
country from an agricultural to an agricultural-industrial 
n a t i o n . A t  present, Albania's per capita gross national 
product is the lowest in Europe. Lack of accessible resources, 
arable land, and a trained work force greatly retard the 
economy's growth rate. The envisioned structural transform­
ation has required support from abroad. Up to the early 
1960s, Albania relied on the Soviet Union for economic and 
technical aid. Since then she has depended on Communist 
China. Communist China is Albania's principal trading partner 
but trade with Eastern Europe and the West has been expanding.
^^"Albania," The Europa Year Book, 1972. I (16th ed.; 
London: Europa Publications Limited, l9/2), p. 507.
44Robert F. Byrnes and George Kish, "Albania," Cowles 
Encyclopedia of Nations, 1968, pp. 2-3.
59
60
Whereas in 1938 industrial production accounted for 
9.1 percent of total production in the country, in 1970 
it accounted for 60.8 percent, output increasing sixty-fourfold. 
Agriculture, the economy’s largest employer, has increased 
production threefold since before World War II, and the area 
of cultivable land has doubled. The post-war years have seen 
an extensive socialist transformation of the countryside; 
land reclamation, mechanization, utilization of chemicals, 
and the complete collectivization of agriculture.^^
Albania is a people's Republic with a one-party system 
of government. In many respects Albania is a closed society. 
The government owns and controls all internal communications 
media. The media is used effectively as an indoctrination 
instrument to reach the masses. Party-controlled agencies 
closely watch the people’s activities. The system of 
controls circumscribe individual freedoms and reach nearly 
every facet of day-to-day life.^^
Albania was under Turkish control from the 1300s until 
1912 when Independence was proclaimed.
Albania’s most notable tradition from ancient times 
has been one of foreign domination. Brief periods of 
independence have been overshadowed by long centuries 
of subjection to alien rule. Foreign rulers never seemed 
able or willing to subject the Albanian peasants to the 
complete authority of a central government. . . . The
^^"Albania," Europa Year Book. 1972. p. 508.
^^Eugene K. Keefe, et al.. Area Handbook for Albania 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19^1), ch. 9.
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foreign domination plus the limited autonomy /jJue to the 
remoteness of their mountain villages/ developed in the 
people a spirit of fierce independence and a suspicion 
of neighboring states who might have designs on their 
territorial integrity.4'
During the 1930s Italian influence became dominant in 
Albania as the lack of natural resources and a poorly 
developed economy created a heavy requirement for foreign aid. 
Excessive reliance on Fascist Italy eventually led to the 
landing of Italian troops on April 7, 1939, and five days 
later a union of Albania with Italy was proclaimed.
Italian efforts to win Albanian support met with
48little popular success. In 1942 a national resistance 
movement, the National Liberation Front, was organized under 
Communist control. By the end of 1944, when German troops 
had been driven from Albania, the Communist Party, under the 
leadership of Enver Hoxha, the.present party leader, was in 
firm control of the nation. The Albanian Communist regime 
had close ties with Yugoslavia which had also come under 
Communist control. The Yugoslav communist-led resistance 
movement had given significant aid to the National Liberation 
Front during the war, but in 1948 when Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union split, the Albanians supported the Soviet Union.
The Sino-Soviet disputes in the early 1960s led to a 
final break in the troubled Soviet-Albanian relations.
Despite its heavy dependence on Soviet economic aid, Albania
Keefe, et al.. Area Handbook for Albania, p. v.
48Byrnes and Kish, "Albania," pp. 2-3.
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supported Communist China in the dispute. During the 1960s 
and 1970s Communist China provided an undetermined amount 
of assistance to the resource-poor, underdeveloped Albanian 
economy.
The goals of the present Communist regime are to
strengthen and perpetuate the Party's hold on the reins of
government, to maintain Albania's independence, and to
modernize society according to the Leninist-Stalin model.
Only modest progress has been made in Communist programs to
49create a monolithic and modernized society. Despite 
modernization efforts, the remote and isolated areas seem to 
preserve old customs and vestiges of the past that detract 
from the collectivization and modernization of society.
49Keefe, Albania. pp. 2-6.
GREECE
A small country of mainland and many islands, Greece 
lies at the southern end of the Balkan Peninsula, where it 
extends into the Mediterranean Sea. This country tradition­
ally has had a high rate of emigration, as Greeks have 
settled throughout the world. Their heritage includes a 
classical age of culture and power during the early days of 
recorded Western history. The people have a close sense of 
national identity that draws strength from an awareness of 
the great achievements of the world's first democracy of 
the classical age. However, modern independence dates only 
from 1829, when Greece gained independence from Ottoman rule. 
The society is dynamic and is increasingly involved in a 
modern industrial and economic transformation.^®
Greece entered World War II on the side of the Allies 
on October 28, 1940, when the country was invaded by Italy. 
Determined and effective Greek resistance drove the Italian 
forces back into Albania despite Italian numerical superiority. 
But Germany quickly followed the Italian invaders and occupied 
Greece until 1944. George Papandreou, one of the political 
leaders of Greece during the war, became the first Prime
^^Allison Butler Herrick, et al.. Area Handbook for 
Greece (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970),
p .  V .
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Minister after the liberation. However, his government was able 
to maintain control for only a few months. A communist-led 
resistance group had political and economic control of the 
countryside, and a right-wing royalist faction dominated parlia­
ment.^^ An election in 1946 restored the monarchy, but before 
King George II could return to the throne, a civil war erupted 
between the right and the left.
This turbulent period was kindled by Greece's desperate 
political and economic troubles and inflamed by the support from 
Yugoslavia for the communist guerrillas and by United States aid 
to the government forces. In 1947 Yugoslavia withdrew military 
assistance concurrently as the United States gave increasingly 
larger financial and military aid to the country under the Truman 
Doctrine. By 1949 the Greek government was able to subdue the 
communist rebels. Two important developments initiated the 
so-called reconstruction period, 1949-1951, and influenced the 
economic and political environment of Greece during the period 
of war and unrest from 1940 to 1949. These developments were 
the end of active war associated with the Communist threat, in
1949, and the increase of American economic assistance to Greece
52under the Marshall Plan Aid program.
King Paul took the throne after his brother George's 
death in 1947. Upon the death of King Paul in 1964, his son
^^George Kren, "Greece," Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations, 
1968, p. S3.
52Kondonassis, "Monetary Policies of the Bank of Greece,"
p. 39.
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succeeded him as Constantine II. Beginning in the mid-1950s to the 
early 1960s, Greece, under the leadership of Prime Minister Karamalis, 
experienced one of its longest periods of political stability.
From 1965 through May, 1967 Greece endured almost continued 
political instability as a result of eight conventional changes 
in government. No one party succeeded in winning a majority in 
parliament, and premiers were forced to rely on weak coalition 
cabinets. George Papandreou, head of the powerful Center Union 
party, resigned in 1965 in a dispute with the king. In March,
1967 Panayotis Canellopoulos, a political rival ot Papandreou, 
was appointed by King Constantine to head the caretaker govern­
ment. Canellopoulos formed a one-party cabinet and dissolved 
parliament in April, 1967 after two years of nearly constant 
political crisis, in order to permit his government to last until 
the scheduled May election could be held. But on April 21 a 
group of army officers representing the more conservative 
elements in the country led a bloodless coup d'etat that wrested 
control of the government from the civilian authorities. The 
leaders of the coup maintained that their takeover had saved 
Greece from a leftist rebellion. In December, 1967 King 
Constantine attempted to overthrow the junta, but failed and went 
into exile in Rome. And in 1968 the new regime, headed by 
Col. George Papadopoulos, who had played a significant part in 
the 1967 coup d'etat won diplomatic recognition for the govern­
ment from the United States and many other countries. During 
the past five years Greece has achieved political stability.
On May 31, 1973, Premier Papadopoulos announced that he was
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abolishing the monarchy and making Greece a presidential republic 
with himself as first provisional president. He is a candidate 
in a popular plebiscite to be held on July 29, 1973, which will 
elect the next president. Parliamentary elections are scheduled 
by the end of 1974.
Greece traditionally has been an agricultural nation, 
producing most of its own needs and exporting a considerable 
amount of produce, The pace of industrial expansion has accel­
erated since Greece became an associate member of the EEC in 
511962, and despite a setback following the coup d'etat in 1967 
industrial production now exceeds that of agriculture.^^ Con­
tinued economic growth means expansion of the industrial and 
service sectors, and competition within the EEC will require 
increasingly efficient production. The problem of becoming 
competitive in industrial production is made difficult by existing 
structural problems in the economy. Most industrial raw materials 
must be imported. Equally significant, family-owned industrial 
units employing less than ten people still account for 95 per­
cent of all units and 50 percent of all industrial employment. 
There is little specialization in small firms since many of them 
produce a variety of products. Vertically- and horizontally- 
integrated firms are rare.
The Greek government exercises control over the economy 
through fiscal and monetary policy, and basic economic goals are 
53Greece is to become a full member of the EEC in 1984.
"Greece," Europa Year Book. 1972, I (16th ed.; London: 
Europa Publications Limited, l4Ï2), p. 817.
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formulated by the government. To achieve these goals various 
incentives are given to certain sectors, subsidies are granted, 
and budget spending is concentrated in these areas. Price 
controls are also u t i l i z e d . A  large balance-of-trade deficit 
has been a feature of the Greek economy, but this has been partly 
offset by "invisibles"--income from tourism, earnings of the large 
merchant fleet, and remittances from Greek workers abroad, with 
the remainder coming from large amounts of foreign investments.^^
Economic growth in Greece has been steady if not spec­
tacular; monetary stability has been achieved; and the economic
57aims of the government appear not to be unreasonable. Therefore, 
the prospects appear good for the continued growth of the Greek 
economy, given domestic and international stability.
^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the Economy 
of Greece, Overseas Business Reports Series (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 3.
^^"Greece," Europe Year Book. 1972. p. 817.
^^Greece's GNP increased 5.5 percent in 1968; 8.5 percent 
in 1969; 10 percent in both 1970 and 1971; and 10.5 percent in 
1972. Workers’ incomes have risen 10 percent per annum. The 
average Athens' Stock Exchange industrial share has climbed 140 
percent since 1967. Tourism, which is Greece's largest single 
source of income, in 1973 is running 21 percent above 1972's 
record-breaking level. Yet prices remain reasonable; the price 
rise in 1972 was less than four percent.
TURKEY
The Republic of Turkey is situated between the Black 
and Mediterranean Seas, linking Europe and southwest Asia. 
This country was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Ketnal, whose 
final name was Kemal Ataturk--"Father of Turks" after the 
collapse of the 600-year-old Ottoman Empire. The ruin of 
the vast empire resulted from its failure to keep pace with 
the social and technological developments of Europe in the 
nineteenth century and the rise of nationalism among several 
nations of the empire. The culminating event was the disas­
trous Ottoman participation as one of Germany's allies in 
World War I. Defeated, stripped of much of its former 
territory, and partially occupied by armies of the victorious 
European states, the Ottoman Empire was rejected by Turkish 
nationalists who rallied under the leadership of Ataturk.
The invading Greek forces, with the aid of Western allies, 
were defeated by the nationalists, who then abolished the
sultanate and the caliphate, the temporal and religious
58ruling institutions of the Old Empire.
Rejecting the imperial ambitions and traditions of 
the Empire, the new Republic concentrated on modernizing and
58U.S. Department of State, Republic of Turkey. Back­
ground Notes Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1971), p. 1.
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Westernizing the ethnically-Turkish core of the Old Empire—  
Anatolia and Thrace.
The series of social, political, religious, 
linguistic, and economic reforms and attitudes 
introduced by Ataturk before his death in 1938 
forms the ideological basis of modern Turkey.
Referred to as ’Ataturkism,' its meaning, con­
tinued validity, and applicability are the 
subject of frequent discussion and debate in 
Turkey's political life.59
Following the death of Ataturk, a member of his own 
Republican People's Party, Ismet pasha (Inonu), governed the 
country until 1946. Inonu continued the Westernization move­
ment. In the period 1946-60 the country went through a cycle 
of liberalization and repression. A multiparty system was 
introduced in 1946, but the Democratic Party which came to 
power in 1950 began to restrict political liberties in 1955. 
The May 27, 1960 military coup ended the First Turkish 
Republic. A new constitution was written, and in 1961 the 
Second Turkish Republic was born with the return to civilian 
government.
Since the birth of the Second Turkish Republic, the 
political scene has been characterized by frequent changes 
of governments and continuing incidents of violence between 
extremists on the right and left. For the first time in 
two years Turkey now, in May, 1973, is in the hands of a
^^U.S. Department of State, Republic of Turkey, p. 2.
G^Thomas D. Roberts, et al.. Area Handbook for the 
Republic of Turkey (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1970); p.“̂ .
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government chosen by the political, parties instead of the 
military. The coalition government of Premier Main Talu has 
promised the enactment of social reforms and the lifting of 
martial law which has been in effect since April, 1971.
The Turkish economy is basically agrarian, with agricul­
ture contributing approximately one-third of the GNP and providing 
employment for 65 percent of the labor force. The industrial 
production index is rising considerably faster than the GNP. 
Turkey's economy is a mixture of public and private enterprise, 
with each sector supplying about half of the combined industrial, 
mining, and energy production. Since 1961 the government has 
encompassed developmental planning in an effort to systematize 
the development process after years of unfocused planning.
In September, 1964 Turkey concluded an association agree­
ment with the EEC, a step that was expected to accelerate economic 
development generally. However, there is a transition period for 
both Turkey and Greece which is designed to permit the countries 
to raise their industrial output and efficiency to a point at 
which it would be realistic for them to allow their industries 
to compete with European producers on an unprotected basis.
Greece is scheduled to become a full member of the Community in 
1984, while Turkey is to receive full membership at a later, but 
as yet unspecified, date. However, the length of the transition 
period has been the subject of much criticism. The argument is
^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Turkey, Foreign Economic 
Trends and Their Implications for the United States Series 
(Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 10.
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that a period this long does not result in much present pressure
62on industry to modernize its production processes. Although 
most economic indicators point to strength in the economy, infla­
tion, and persistent budget deficits continue to elude solution. 
High unemployment and the inability to provide for new arrivals 
to the labor force resulting from the high population growth 
are also major economic problems with dangerous political 
implications.
In spite ot Turkey's many difficult problems which remain 
61unsolved, the present reading of the current political situation 
is that relative political stability will continue under the 
present government, or a government along similar lines,
62U.S. Department of Commerce, Market Profiles for the Near 
East and South Asia-Turkey. Overseas Business Reports Series 
(Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 22;
U.S. Department of Commerce, Turkey, p. 6; Roberts, Turkey, p. 7.
6*î Two significant problems are the differences in outlook 
between Westernized city dwellers and traditional-minded villagers 
and the Cyprus issue which has been a burden to the development 
programs due to the increased defense outlays.
CYPRUS
The Republic of Cyprus is a mountainous island in 
the eastern Mediterranean about 60 miles south of Turkey.
It is the third largest Mediterranean island next to Sicily 
and S a rdinia.The population of Cyprus was an estimated 
643,000 in 1971. The Greeks and Turks, who together make 
up almost the entire population (78 percent and 18 percent, 
respectively) live and generally work in separate commun­
ities.^^ The exclusiveness and separation of the Greek and 
Turkish communities is the most striking feature of Cypriot 
society.
At the top of the society in both communities are a 
few rich persons who control a large share of the wealth.
The middle class, relatively small in number, is larger 
proportionally in the Greek than in the Turkish community.
After 1963 the Turkish community did not share fully the 
benefits of the country’s increasing economic activity.
However, since 1968 efforts have been made to increase 
Turkish participation in the economy and to return refugees
64"Cyprus,” Europa Year Book. 1972. I (15th ed.;
London; Europa Publications Limited, 1972), p. 589.
^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Cyprus. Overseas Business Reports Series (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1.
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from the period of intercommunal conflict, 1963-1967, to 
their former homes.
The constitution of Cyprus, adopted at the time of inde­
pendence from the British in 1960, provided for a republic with 
government posts divided proportionally between the Greek and 
Turkish communities. The president was to be a Greek­
speaking Christian, the vice president a Turkish-speaking 
Muslim, The parliament was also divided--70 percent Greek 
and 30 percent Turkish. The structure of the government 
was designed to safeguard the status of the two ethnic 
communities and provide representation for both. This was 
in response to long-standing differences between Turkey 
and Greece regarding the island’s political status. As 
President Makarios remarked at the time of independence,
"a state but not a nation.
The period of intercommunal conflict arising over 
a proposed constitutional change that would have reduced 
the power of the Turkish minority and the continuing demand 
for Greek Cypriots for union with Greece resulted in the 
separation of the two communities and the withdrawal of
^^Thomàs W. Adams, et al.. Area Handbook for Cyprus 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, l470),
pp. 2-3.
^^U.S. Department of State. Republic of Cyprus. 
Department of State Background Notes Series (Washington, D.C.; 
Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 3.
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the Turkish Cypriots from the central government.^®* In
April, 1964 a United Nations peace-keeping force was set up
and a U.N. Mediator appointed. The intervention of U.N.
forces helped to limit both the scale of the conflict through
the most critical period (1964-67) and terrorists’ activities
after that p e r i o d . Y e t  today this conflict between the
two major segments of the population over the issue of
national identification continues unresolved, and is at the
72heart of the "Cyprus problem."
The Cypriot economy is based primarily on agriculture.
More than one-third of its economically active population
73and three-fifths of its land is devoted to farming. The 
Greek community is responsible for 90 percent of business in 
Cyprus, and despite the internal turmoil, the economy remains
68U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Cyprus, p. 2.
®*Turkish participation in government and legislation 
was withdrawn in January, 1964, after which the post of vice 
president was abolished. In June, 1966, all Turkish judges 
resigned, "Cyprus," Europa Year Book, 1972, p. 589.
^^Adams, Cyprus, p. 5.
^^The Cyprus crisis of November, 1967 brought Greece 
and Turkey, both members of NATO, close to open conflict and 
war between the two countries was narrowly avoided. Unfortun­
ately, the end of the crisis left the basic problems of Cyprus 
unresolved, but the conflict illustrates the capability of such 
an event amplifying to significant importance and reaching 
beyond the shores of the small island republic.
72U.S. Department of State, Cyprus. p. 1.
73Adams , Cyprus. p. 6.
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remarkably strong. From 1968 through 1972 the economy has 
achieved a growth rate in real terms of over 8 percent each 
year.^^ Cyprus has recently joined the EEC as an associate 
member. The economic system viewed as a whole is a partnership 
of private enterprise and the government. The public sector 
owns and controls the power plants, and money is controlled 
through a central bank. The bulk of the economy is privately 
operated, but the activities of the government as financier and 
regulator are increasing.Tourism is encouraged by the govern­
ment and is an important source of income. The number of 
arrivals in Cyprus in 1971 increased by 40.2 percent over the 
previous year and earnings increased by a spectacular 67 percent.
The year 1972 heralds the beginning of the Third Five-Year 
Plan, The new plan is characterized by a shift in emphasis from 
the development of import-substitution to export-oriented 
industry, and the development of Cyprus' position as the Medi­
terranean region's re-exporter.^^ However, until the political
conflict is resolved, all aspects of the island's life are
78likely to remain in a precarious state.
^^"Cyprus," Europa Year Book. 1972, p. 589.
^^Adams, Cyprus, p. 6.
^^U.S, Department of Commerce, Cyprus, Foreign Economic 
Trends and Their Implications for the United States Series 




Malta is comprised of two main islands (Malta and
Gozo), and the small islands of Comino. In 1530, the
Maltese Islands were ceded by Charles V of Spain to the
rich and powerful Order of the Knights of St. John of
Jerusalem. Under the Knights the island grew prosperous
7 9for the next 268 years from Mediterranean trade. The
military strength and effectiveness of the Order declined
from 1600 to 1700, and in 1798 Malta surrendered to
Napoleon. But after a two-year insurrection, the people
of Malta, with the help of the British, drove out the
French. Thereafter, the Maltese requested permanent British
protection. In 1314 Malta became a British Crown colony
a n d  a vital naval base— the headquarters of the British
80Mediterranean fleet.
The islanders became self-governing during the 1920s 
but two issues soon sharply divided the island--the choice 
of Maltese or Italian as an official language and church- 
state relations. The conflict grew in intensity until in 
1936 Malta’s home rule was abolished by England. During
79U.S. Department of State, Malta, Background Notes 
Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972),
p. 1.
80Charles Nowell, "Malta,” Cowles Encyclopedia of 
Nations, 1968, p. 127.
81 Ibid.. pp. 127-28.
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World War II Malta played a strategic role as a base for 
the invasion of Sicily. After the war the country worked 
to achieve sufficient unity to allow for the return of 
complete internal self-government, which it received in 
1962. Maltese and English were made the official languages, 
and Rom,an Catholicism was declared the official religion.
In 1964 Malta obtained full independence.
Under its 1964 Constitution, Malta is a parliamentary
monarchy within the Commonwealth. Her Majesty, the Queen,
is represented by the Covernor-General. The Governor-
General exercises executive authority on the Queen's behalf,
but the actual direction and control of the government and
the nation's affairs are in the hands of the Cabinet under
the leadership of the Prime Minister (head of government).
The Governor-General appoints as Prime Minister the leader
82of the majority party.
Malta is attempting to advance and restructure its 
underdeveloped economy and to gradually lessen its economic 
dependence on the expenditures of British military forces 
stationed on the island, which have been its economic main­
stay since 1814. Two 5-year plans (1959-64 and 1964-69) 
were aimed primarily at diversifying the economy. New 
industry was established; military shipyards were converted 
to commercial ship repairs; artd tourism was promoted.
89"Malta," Europa Year Book. 1972. I (16th ed.; London: 
Europa Publications Limited, 1972), p. 956; U.S. Department of 
State, Malta, p. 3.
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However, the reduction in British troop strength over the 
past several years has put a severe strain on the Maltese 
economy which condition will continue as further reductions
occur, depending on the policy of the British and Maltese
83 84governments. ’
Malta has no proven mineral resources other than
limestone and salt. This country has no known petroleum or
hydroelectric potentials. Agriculture on Malta is small in
scale. Although almost 60 percent of the island's total land
is devoted to farming, the soil is generally shallow because
of the abundance of limestone rock. About 70 percent of the
8 5nation's food must be imported. Tourism is one of the
island's most important industries. In April, 1971 Malta 
joined the EEC as an associate member.
QO
U.S. Department of State, Malta, p. 3.
^^The present government has increased its demands 
for higher rents from the British military bases on Malta.
QC
U.S. Department of State, Malta. p. 2.
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Summary
In their attempts to solve their post-war difficulties, 
most of the nations discussed in this chapter have used widely 
varying solutions. Yet the difficulties themselves have shown 
great similarity. The need for economic recovery, military 
security, and political stability have been the foremost problems 
faced by each government since 1945.
The democratic countries have faced a great deal of 
internal discontent because their achievements, as usual in 
demoerLaĵ .c societies, fell short of expectations. France’s 
efforts at recovery after the war have been seriously retarded 
by political instability. The instability was heightened by the 
innumerable divisions among its electorate and by almost contin­
uous nationalist revolts in her colonies. The Italian political 
scene since the war has been noted for its recurring political 
crises. Despite Communist sentiments among many Italians, the 
government has been undeviating in support of the West. The 
political history of Greece since the war has been characterized 
by periods of incessant political instability. Continuous 
political stability, seemingly of utmost importance for the 
economic advancement of this nation, has been achieved, but the 
price has been the abolishment of the previous democratic form 
of government. In Cyprus the conflict between the two major 
segments of the population over the issue of national indenti- 
fication continues unresolved, and until a settlement is reached 
all aspects of the island's life are likely to remain in a 
precarious state.
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The future of the European nations of the Mediterranean 
Sea as active participants in world affairs lies in their ability 
to overcome nationalistic antagonisms and work toward a European 
Integration through the framework of the EEC. The safe predic­
tion is that these nations will continue on their present track: 
toward a fairly sophisticated economic federation, but probably 
well short of the political union that Jean Monnet envisioned 
in the 1950's.
CHAPTER IV
NON-EUROPEAN NATIONS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Introduction
Few areas of the world provoke more interest, contro­
versy, or international crises than the Middle East-North Africa. 
Although these countries that border the Eastern and Southern 
coast of the Mediterranean Sea have only received popular 
attention since World War II, the area has been an important 
center of world events throughout history. From ancient times, 
the area has given birth to four great civilizations--Egyptian, 
Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian. The three principal mono­
theistic religions— Judaism, Christianity, and Islam— have taken 
seed and flourished here. The area was successively a part of 
the Persian, Greek, Roman, Arab, Mongol, Tartar, and Turkish 
empires, each contributing to a new blending of culture and 
civilization there— blendings that at times reached high points 
in man's development.^
Since the end of the nineteenth century all of these
countries have been strongly influenced by the Western world 
yet few have successfully adapted themselves to Western political,
^Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (2nd ed.; New York:
Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1971;, p. 1.
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economic, and social systems. Anti-Western sentiments are 
strongly expressed by several of the nations who are moving away 
from the adherence to Western institutions.
The concern of these nations is what form of government 
can best bring about and direct the social and economic reforms 
needed to provide for their expanding populations. The popula­
tion problem arises as the result of a high birth-rate, together 
with a fairly high death-rate which is now in some countries 
declining rapidly as the result of improvements in public health.
A concomitant problem is that of migration to the cities. For 
the urban areas this has resulted in congestion and falling 
levels of subsistence, while the declining rural areas have 
experienced a fall-off in agricultural production. In Egypt, for 
instance, it is believed that the production of foodstuffs has 
actually declined during the last thirty years, despite a growth 
in population numbers. Under such conditions it is not difficult 
to suggest a possible relationship between the current demographic 
situation of an underemployed, underfed but increasing proletariat, 
and the political instability that characterizes this area of 
the world.
A second problem arises from the social inequality that 
characterizes many of the Middle East-North Africa countries.
There is a large group of the poor, and a small number of wealthy 
families, with few of a 'middle' class. Most significantly many 
experts maintain that the gap between the groups is widening 
rather than closing.
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A third problem concerns the political organization in 
several of the countries. By temperament and experience many 
of the people of this region incline to personal and author­
itarian forms of rule. In consequence, the idea of Parliamentary 
Democracy has had a limited and uncertain extension. The average 
man has tended to be impatient with Western democratic methods, 
preferring to follow a single individual of superior appeal and 
ability. The individual has most often come from the officer 
ranks of the armed forces, espousing a leftist or even radical 
opinion essentially different from the bourgeois attitudes of 
the merchant groups. In more recent times, there has been a 
tendency towards a renewal of personal rule, the outstanding 
instances being in Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.
The widest problem of all concerns the cultural crisis 
within modern Islam. Since the end of the Middle Ages there 
has been a considerable decline in the power and intellectual 
strength of Islamic culture. Large-scale political penetration 
and domination from Europe began in the nineteenth century, and 
for several centuries standards of living have no longer approx­
imated to those of the West. As a result there has been much 
introspection in the Arab world upon the reasons for this decline. 
Three broad points of view are in evidence: (1) There are those
who advocate a discontinuation of Islamic traditions, and so 
wish to follow a new way of life--either Christian and Western, 
or, less clearly, new materialistic doctrines, one ultimate
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expression of which may be Communism; (2) At the opposite extreme 
are those who suggest a return to a stricter form of Islam— this 
policy is followed to some extent in Libya; (3) The third group 
wishes to combine modernity with a maintenance of internal tradi­
tions. The result of these widely diverse views has been to give 
us the phenomenon of the 'angry young arab'--given more and more 
to rejection of existing ways, critical of the failure of leader­
ship over the Israeli question, and of inequalities in and lack 
of opportunity for economic advancement. He has an increasing
sense of frustration which becomes more and more vocal with the
2spread of literacy.
The main element in the contemporary politics of this 
region is the existence of the state of Israel. To most Arabs, 
the creation of a Jewish state was a clear demonstration of 
hostility toward the Arab world on the part of Britain, France, 
and the United States— a view which the events of 1956 and then 
of 1967 seemed only to confirm. The Arabs feel that there can 
be no real friendship or understanding with the West until support 
for Zionism is disavowed. Increasingly Arab states have turned 
to the U.S.S.R. for support against Zionism and its patrons.
In the economic sphere it is more difficult to present a 
clearly defined picture. There is the unique asset of petroleum, 
which has already transformed ways of life in areas where it is
^The Middle East and North Africa; 1969-1970 (16th ed.; 
London: Europa Publications, 1969), pp. 13-14.
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produced (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria), and brought unexpected wealth 
to port terminals such as Tripoli (Lebanon).
As a consequence of petroleum, a striking inequality has 
developed between various countries, e.g., the oil countries of 
Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia in contrast to the non-oil countries 
of Syria, Egypt, and Morocco. Those actually producing oil have 
substantial sums of extra wealth which can be used for vast 
development schemes.
As regards agriculture and industry the position is less 
satisfactory. The region, on the whole, is resource poor and 
condemned by aridity. Nevertheless, significant increases in 
standards of living have been made by several countries.
For the nations of North Africa, the liquidation of 
colonial rule continues to have two adverse economic effects:
(1) The independence struggles resulted in the dislocation of 
large masses of people and the disruption of the fragile economies 
which formerly had been strongly integrated with that of France;
(2) The withdrawal of French 'colons' who contributed in 
predominant measure to the more highly developed economic activ- 
ities--all of these will take time to dissipate.
These and other problems will now be explored as an exam­
ination is made of the relevant historical and contemporary 
factors governing the internal policies as well as the external 
relations of the nations within the area. Specific attention 
will be given to the period 1948-1966.
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
The Syrian Arab Republic, a Middle Eastern state, 
secured full independence in 1946 after a quarter of a 
century rule by France and several centuries as part of 
the Ottoman Empire. In February, 1958 Syria united with 
Egypt to form the United Arab Republic, with Egypt's Gamal 
Abdel Nasser as President. Syria's political instability, 
the parallelism of Syrian and Egyptian policies, and the 
appeal of Egyptian President Nasser's leadership in the 
wake of the Suez Crisis of 1956 created the support in
3Syria for the merger with Egypt. The union with Egypt 
lasted only three years. The reasons for the dissolvement 
are many, but there is little doubt that the stringent 
economic measures introduced into Syria to bring her economy 
in line with that of Egypt were chiefly to blame. Syria's 
interests lay in free trade and an open economy, while 
Egypt's lay in protectionism and nationalism. Economic 
austerity and Egyptian mismanagement led to a coup d'état 
in Damascus and the secession of Syria from the Union in 
September, 1961.^ Since the secession, the Syrian political
3U.S. Department of State, Syrian Arab Republic. 
Background Notes Series (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1971), p. 2.
^Abbas Kelidar, "Syrian Arab Republic," The Middle 
East: A Handbook, ed. by Michael Adams (New Yorïcl Praeeer.
1971), P .-TÔ 7.-----
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scene has been marked by a series of successful and attempted 
coups d'etat, and in November, 1970 the present government in 
office, that of President Hafiz al Asad, came to power by 
means of a military coup.
The Syrian army traditionally has played a key role 
in Syrian politics. The lineup of factions within the army 
often has been the elemental factor in the changes of govern­
ments. These factions frequently have been influenced by 
external social and political forces emanating from Baghdad 
and Cairo, the common denominator being a leftist political 
orientation. The present political party in power, the Ba'ath 
Party, has, through the years, achieved considerable success 
in gaining supporters from within the army. The party is 
socialistic  ̂and is dedicated to carrying a Socialist revo­
lution to every part of the Arab world. The party also has 
attracted supporters of all faiths in other Arab countries, 
especially Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.^
After assuming power in 1970 the Asad government has 
made efforts to win the confidence of the people by relaxing
^The nationalization decrees of the 1960s resulted in 
the nationalization of almost all medium- and large-scale 
industries and the redistribution of the land to large numbers 
of formerly landless peasants. Both events have altered a 
society that was predominantly tribal and archaic. Richard F. 
Nyrop, et al., Area Handbook for Syria (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 3; Kelidar, "Syrian 
Arab Republic," p. 303.
^U.S. Department of State, Syrian Arab Republic.
pp. 3-4.
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security measures and emphasizing economic development 
programs. The regime also has placed firmer restrictions 
on the operations of the strong Palestinian guerrilla organ­
ization based in Syria. This organization has concentrated 
its efforts from camps in Lebanon and Jordan, creating 
serious difficulties from Israeli reprisal attacks for all
7three countries. In September, 1971 Syria joined with 
Libya and Egypt to form the Federation of Arab Republics.
Syria's major natural resource is its agricultural 
land, although less than half of the country's total area 
is considered suitable for cultivation. The expansion of 
the amount of irrigated land devoted to the growing of high- 
grade cotton has been of great significance to the economy 
and will continue to be during the 1970s. The other known 
natural resources consist of a sizeable hydroelectric 
potential, some comparatively modest reserves of petroleum 
and phosphates, and scattered deposits of a few minor 
minerals.
The labor force as a whole reflects a scarcity of 
trained technical and managerial personnel. For this reason 
the country continues to be largely dependent on foreign 
experts, many of them from the Soviet Union, for economic 
and social development programs. Implementation of the 
development programs also presupposes a continuance of foreign
Q
economic assistance, also largely from the Soviet Union.
^U.S. Department of State, Syrian Arab Republic, p. 4.g
Nyrop, Area Handbook for Syria, pp. 193-94.
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Syria has been plagued by chronic balance-of-payments 
problems, the roots of which go back to the drought years 
of 1958-61 and the capital flight caused by the fear of 
socialism. And recently, the dislocations caused by the 
socialization of broad areas of the economy and the demands 
of an ambitious economic development program are contributing 
factors. Military expenditures, accounting for about one- 
half of the country's budget and reflecting the continuing 
tension between Syria and Israel, are a continuing drag on
9the economy.
Syria has been particularly subject to the political
instability which has been endemic throughout the Middle East
since World War II. The development of the country's economy,
therefore, has been determined to a greater degree perhaps
than anywhere else in the Middle East by the vagaries of
10her political history, 
gU.S. Department of State, Syrian Arab Republic, p. 4. 
^^Kelidar, "Syrian Arab Republic," p. 304.
LEBANON
Lebanon is an independent parliamentary republic at 
the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. Its area is limited 
to a narrow stretch of land, 156 miles long and averaging 
about 31 miles wide, between neighboring Syria on the north 
and east and Israel on the south. The Lebanese people are 
largely Arab. The population is almost equally divided 
between Christians and Muslims and is concentrated in the 
port cities of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. Lebanon has been 
characterized since 1860 by heavy emigration, primarily to 
North and South America, of Lebanese Christians who initially 
sought sanctuary from the exploitation and oppression of the 
Ottoman rule. Today there are almost as many Lebanese living 
abroad as in Lebanon.
The country was the homeland of the Phoenician civil­
ization, famous for its commercial and naval power. Lebanon's 
excellent deep-water ports have made it an important trading 
center since ancient times. Commerce expanded after the 
Arab and Ottoman conquests in the 600s A.D. and 1500s,
^^Sara Gilbert and Charles Issawi, "Lebanon," Cowles 
Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968. p. 119; "Lebanon," Europa Year 




respectively, during which periods the country's mountains
1 9became a refuge for religious minorities, mainly Christians.
Throughout the period of Ottoman rule the Lebanese
Christian and Muslim communities expanded, and the two
occasionally came into conflict. In 1860 a revolt by Christian
peasants against Muslim overlords ignited widespread religious
strife, eventually leading to civil war. Britain and France
intervened and forced Turkey to give Lebanon an autonomous
government that apportioned power equally between the Christians
13and the Muslims.
The modern state developed from five Turkish districts
detached from the defeated Ottoman Empire in 1920 when, along
with Syria, the area was awarded to France under a League of
Nations mandate. In 1945 Lebanon was admitted to the United
Nations as an independent and sovereign state; it also joined
the Arab League. The last French troops were withdrawn in
1946, and in 1947 parliamentary elections were held.
Lebanon attempts to follow a more neutral policy in the
disputes between Arab states and in foreign affairs, while
accepting the Arab policy of boycotting Israel. In 1938,
however, the Lebanese government accused Egypt of inciting a
widespread rebellion. Civil war was ended only with the
14landing of United States troops.
  --------------------------------------------------------------
Gilbert, "Lebanon," p. 119; Harvey H. Smith, et al., 
Area Handbook for Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: Government




Israeli commandos raided the Beirut airport in December, 
1968, destroying or damaging aircraft worth ̂ 15 million belonging 
to the National Airlines of Lebanon (MEA). The raid, said to be 
a reprisal for Palestinian guerrilla use of Lebanon as a base, 
caused the fall of the coalition government in January, 1969. 
Sulaiman Franjiya was elected President in August, 1970. The 
activities of the guerrillas persisted in the south of the country 
and Israel continued reprisal raids into Lebanon in 1973.^^ The 
recurrent operations of the Palestinian guerrillas have affixed 
an aura of uncertainty and tension to the political climate.
Lebanon is a republic in which power is divided between 
Christians and Muslims. The custom is for the President to be 
a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and 
for the rest of the Cabinet to represent other f a i t h s . T h e  
President, elected by a unicameral parliament, is head
^^"Lebanon," Europa Year Book, p. 882.
^^Stability will be out of reach for Lebanon, as for its 
Arab neighbors, until the fundamental problem or Arab-Israeli 
relations is solved. David Cowan, "Lebanon,” in The Middle East;
A Handbook, ed. by Michael Adams (New York: Praeger, 1971),
p. 251. On May 2, 1973 Lebanese troops clashed with Palestinian 
guerrillas in the streets of Beirut in the worst fighting since 
a similar outbreak in 1969. President Sulaiman Franjiya vowed 
he would not tolerate a Palestinian "occupation army" in Lebanon.
^^"Lebanon," Europa Year Book, p. 888.
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of state. Members of parliament are popularly elected under 
a system of confessional representation by which each 
religious group elects a number of representatives in pro­
portion to its membership.
Traditionally, the economy is based on private enter­
prise. This system has worked relatively well, giving Lebanon
the highest per capita GNP of the non-petroleum-endowed Arab 
18countries. Agriculture employs about half the labor force; 
industry, less than one-tenth; yet their contributions to the 
national income are approximately the same.^^ Lebanon's 
strategic geographic location relative to the oil-rich Middle 
Eastern states and its private-enterprise-oriented government 
have combined with the national character of the people to 
produce a predominantly trading economy. Beirut is the 
principal commercial and financial center of the Middle East. 
Transit trade, with the attendant service requirements such 
as good transportation and banking facilities, has been a key 
component in the growth of the economy since World War II. 
Lebanon also receives a significant percentage of its national 
income from expenditures by tourists and seasonal residents.
18U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the Economy 
of Lebanon, by John P. Edwards, Overseas Business Reports Series 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 3.
19Smith, Lebanon, p. 213.
20U.S. Department of Commerce, Lebanon, p. 3.
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The future outlook for the economy is somewhat clouded. 
Structurally, the economy is poorly balanced. For the country’s 
well being Lebanon's highly-developed, service-oriented economy 
is excessively dependent on foreign countries. The uneven 
distribution of income is a threat to domestic stability--four 
percent of the population receives about 32 percent of all 
income, while 50 percent of the population receives only about 
18 percent. The economy, particularly banking and tourism, is 
vulnerable to the capricious situation in the Middle East.
Despite their problems, life is not entirely gloomy for 
the Lebanese. Money is flowing into Beirut banks, partly as a 
result of the upward movements in oil prices. The rapid develop­
ment of light industry has provided some needed diversification;
tourism has continued to expand; and Lebanon has signed an
21economic cooperation agreement with the EEC.
21U.S. Department of Commerce, Lebanon, pp. 9-10.
ISRAEL
Situated at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, 
the State of Israel, in existence only since 1948, is an 
independent, semi-socialist, parliamentary democracy. Modern 
Israel, in the midst of hostile Arab neighbors, is a pre­
dominantly Jewish state, populated by only 3 million people 
and possessing few vital resources. Geographically and 
topographically the country is a segment of the Middle East, 
but in most other respects its people are Western-oriented.
The great majority of Israeli leaders, or their forefathers,
22have immigrated to the area within the past century.
Because of the widespread ramifications of the continuing
turmoil in the Middle East, Israel plays an increasingly
23important role in world affairs related to this region.
The creation of the modern state of Israel in 
1948 was preceded by more than a half-century of
22 Since its creation Israel has absorbed 1.5 million 
immigrants from all over the world. The migration pattern 
has brought about a cultural and economic chasm between Jews 
from the West and "Oriental" Jews from North Africa and the 
Middle East. Raised in Muslim societies, these latter Jews 
came to Israel impoverished, poorly educated,, and ill-equipped 
for life in a modern nation. They have remained at the bottom 
of the economic ladder. "Israel at 25," Newsweek Magazine.
May 7, 1973, pp. 49, 51.
23Harvey H. Smith, et al.. Area Handbook for Israel 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ôffice, 1^70), p. 1.
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efforts by Zionist leaders to create a nation as a 
Jewish homeland for Jews dispersed throughout the 
world. Over the years prior to 1948 Jews had 
immigrated to the area which is now Israel, fleeing 
persecution and seeking fulfillment of the Zionist 
dream.24
Prior to 1948 Palestine (of which present-day Israel 
now forms a part) was a Mandated Territory under British 
colonial administration. The flow of Jewish immigration and 
Arab apprehension over the displacement of the Palestinians, 
and the impending creation of an alien state finally led to 
war between Jews and Arabs in 1947. The State of Israel 
was proclaimed on May 14, 1948, the termination date of the 
British Mandate. Fighting continued until January, 1949, 
when a truce was brought about under United Nations auspices.
No general peace settlement has been achieved and no Arab 
state has diplomatic relations with Israel. Incidents of 
terrorism and retaliatory acts have occurred intermittently 
since,the truce.
In October, 1956 Israel invaded the Gaza Strip and 
Sinai Peninsula, coincident with operations by French and 
British forces against Egypt in the Suez Canal area. Israel 
forces withdrew in March, 1957 after the United Nations 
established the U.N. Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip and 
the Sinai. A six-day war against the Arab countries in 
June, 1967 left Israel in possession of all Jerusalem, the
24U.S. Department of State, State of Israel. Background 
Notes Series (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,
1971), p. 1.
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west bank of the Jordan River, the Sinai Peninsula, the
Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. The formerly Jordanian-
controlled sector of Jerusalem was almost immediately
integrated into the State of Israel; the other regions still
retain the official status of "occupied areas" although
Israel continues to graft the Arab lands ever more tightly
onto the Jewish nation. Since the June, 1967 war, efforts
have been made to reach a peaceful settlement of the Arab-
Israel dispute, but severe border incidents and raids have
25occurred, and the basic conflicts remain.
The organization of Israel's economy is unlike that
of any other country in the world. From the earliest days
of the State in 1948 to the present, the Israeli government
has played an important part in the economy in order to
promote national aims and objectives. Large capital imports
have been obtained mainly from public and semipublic sources
abroad and have passed through such national institutions
as the Jewish Agency, the United Israel Appeal, and the
26Jewish National Fund, As a result, the public sector has 
had control of a large part of the capital available for 
investment. These circumstances are responsible for the
^^"Israel," Europa Year Book, j-972. II (16th ed. ; 
London: Europa Publications Limited, 14)2), p. 706; U.S.
Department of State, Israel. pp. 1-3.
26U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Israel. Overseas Business Reports Series 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 3.
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creation of a large sector of public and semi-public enter­
prises in almost every branch of the economy.
Also playing a major and unique role in the economy 
is the Histadrut (General Federation of Trade Unions), which, 
in addition to being a labor organization of over 750,000
workers, owns and operates on a cooperative basis between
2720 and 25 percent of the industrial plants in Israel.
Particular features of agriculture are the Kibbutzim
(collective settlement), the irrigation schemes, and the
28reclamation of the vast Negev desert in the south.
In the last five years Israel's industrial output 
has more than doubled, and its currency reserves are at an 
all time high of $1.2 billion. The GNP is rising at an 
average rate of 9 percent a year (from $3.2 billion in 1950 
to $28 billion in 1972), while the country's exports are 
48 times greater than they were in 1949. Israel has not 
made such rapid economic strides without costs, however. 
Defense spending— approximately half the total national 
budget--is now four times as large as it was at the time of 
the 1967 war, and is increasing every year. The currency 
has repeatedly been devalued and at the same time prices have 
soared. The cost of living rose 14 percent in 1972. ^
27U.S. Department of Commerce, Israel, p. 3.
28"Israel," Europa Year Book, p. 706, At present, 
only 4 percent of the population live on the kibbutzims.
29"Israel at 25," Newsweek, pp. 48-49.
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The presence and status of the more than one million 
Arabs now in the occupied lands poses deeper problems for 
Israel. One of Israel's nagging nightmares is that the Arabs, 
with their soaring birthrate, will someday outnumber Jews in 
the Jewish homeland. And in a state that wants to see itself 
as the model of democracy, the denial of meaningful political 
rights to the Arabs gives some Israelis a discomforting feel­
ing. Yet, assimilation of the Arabs seems impossible to many 
Israelis concerned about their country's distinctive religious 
foundation.^®
As Israel has recently celebrated the 25th year of 
Independence, she faces the awesome challenges of coping with 
the internal strains arising from its quick success and of 
achieving a lasting peace with her Arab neighbors. The 
response to the latter challenge will have enduring reper­
cussions on the greater part of the Mediterranean society.
^®"Israel at 25," Newsweek, pp. 48-49.
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
The Arab Republic of Egypt, the most populous country
and recognized leader of the Arab world, is in the southeast
corner of the Mediterranean Sea. About 97 percent of the
land is arid and uninhabited. Virtually all of the country's
economic life is concentrated in the three percent which is
cultivable, comprising little more than the Nile River Valley 
31and its Delta.
Although an Egyptian nationalist movement developed in 
the 1870s against British and French domination of the govern­
ment, the country did not gain its independence until 1922.
At this time Egypt became a monarchy. The monarchy was over­
thrown in July, 1952 by a group of young army officers ("Free 
Officers"), one of whom was Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser who 
was later to emerge as the leader of Egypt. The Free Officers 
were motivated by a desire to remove elements that tradition­
ally had exploited the country. They sought to raise the 
standard of living, develop the country's economic and
military strength, and unify the Arab world under Egyptian 
32leadership. Pursuit of these objectives at times has led
2Y""— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, by kichard M. Loughlin, 
Overseas Business Reports Series (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1972), p. 1.
32U.S. Department of State, Arab, Republic of Egypt. 
Background Notes Series (Washington, 6.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1972), p. 3.
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Egypt into clashes with the West. In October, 1954 Britain
and Egypt reached agreement on the Suez Canal when provision
was made for the withdrawal of British troops. In 1956 the
United States and Britain withdrew offers of a loan for the
building of the Aswan High Dam, causing Nasser to nationalize
the Suez Canal and announce his intentions to use Canal
revenues to build the dam. Nasser also accepted large-scale
Soviet aid in the project. Frustrated in their attempts to
retain some measure of control over the Canal, Britain and
France entered into a secret understanding with Israel
33involving military action. British, French, and Israeli 
forces attacked Egypt in October, 1956, and after a brief but 
intense struggle, both sides accepted a United Nations cease­
fire. Nasser succeeded in turning a military defeat into a 
political victory since the Suez War established Nasser as 
the recognized leader of the Arab world.
In 1967, after a series of measures against Israel, 
Egypt blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, cutting off Israel's outlet 
to the Red Sea. On June 5 warfare erupted between the Arab
states and Israel, and by June 10th the Israelis had again 
defeated the Arab forces. By this time, all participants had 
accepted a cease-fire; Israel had opened the Gulf of Aqaba, 
occupied the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, and seized
33"United Arab Republic," The Middle East and North 
Africa (16th ed.; London: Europa Publications Limited, l9b9),
pTT97.
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control of the west bank of the Jordan River. Soviet military
assistance soon made good the Egyptian losses of the war.
However, a permanent solution to the conflict has not as yet 
34been achieved. Periodic guerrilla activities in the 
occupied territories, charges and countercharges, and threats 
and counterthreats have characterized Egyptian-Israeli rela­
tions in the intervening years.
President Nasser died on September 28, 1970 and was 
succeeded by his vice president, Anwar el Sadat. In 
September, 1971, Egypt, Libya, and Syria agreed to federate. 
Despite President Sadat's frequent assertion that a 'decisive' 
solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is imminent, the uneasy 
truce between Egyptian and Israeli forces continues.
Since 1967 the Egyptian economy has functioned under
36conditions of war: (1) The Suez Canal remains closed;
(2) Sinai, with its oil fields, remains under Israeli occupa- 
’3 7tion; (3) Israeli reprisal attacks have repeatedly hit 
major economic targets such as the Suez refinery and the 
Helwan industrial complex near Cairo; (4) Unemployment remains
34"Egypt," Europa Year Book. 1972. II (16th ed.; London: 
Europa Publications Limited, 197%), p. 453; L. Carl Brown and 
Alexander Melamid, "United Arab Republic (Egypt)," Cowles 
Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968. p. 193.
35Sadat's "No Peace, No.War" policy is very unpopular
in Egypt.
36Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya are providing Egypt 
with aid as a replacement for the lost revenues from the Canal,
37The current loss of the Sinai oil deposits has been 
largely compensated for by the discovery of important oilfields 
on the mainland. "Egypt," Europa Year Book, p. 454.
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high for both unskilled and professional labor; (5) Inflation
persists due to the heavy repayment in agricultural products
to the Soviet Union for continuing military aid; (6) Tourism
has been drastically reduced; (7) Expenditures for the war
itself and the continuing state of military preparedness since
have severely strained the economy; and (7) Expenditures on
38development have declined. Emergency measures which first 
appeared temporary are gradually becoming permanent as 
Egyptian-Israeli relations remain tense.
Notwithstanding the Arab Republic of Egypt's diffi­
culties, progress has been made in several important areas:
(1) A 1 extensive birth control campaign has been started with 
the aim of slowing the rapid population growth; (2) Compre­
hensive social welfare schemes are now in effect; (3) A 
program of socialism has been substantially accomplished;
(4) Steps have been taken to redistribute land to the poorer 
peasants; (5) Internal security restrictions have been 
liberalized; and (6) The completion of the Aswan High Dam in 
1970 has increàsed the fertile land in Egypt by one-third. 
Nevertheless, the continuing hostilities with Israel over­
shadow all facets of Egyptian life. Besides the large-scale 
waste of resources, the conflict may lead to the development 
of a new ideology in the entire area.
38 "United Arab Republic," Middle East and North Africa,
p. 800.
LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC
The Libyan Arab Republic stretches along the 
Mediterranean from Tunisia to Egypt. This vast country 
is almost entirely desert. Less than two percent of the 
land is cultivated and less than one percent is forested. 
Rainfall averages about 14 inches a year along the Mediter­
ranean coast. There is virtually no rainfall in the Sahara 
39desert region.
Formerly an Italian colony, Libya was conquered in 
1942 by French and English troops. A deadlock ensued as to 
which major power would assume trusteeship for Libya. In 
1949 the United Nations General Assembly resolved that Libya 
should become an independent state. Following Independence, 
the United Kingdom of Libya enjoyed political stability and 
good relations with both the Arab world and the West, though 
oil supplies to the latter were restricted soon after the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war. On September 1, 1969 in a bloodless 
coup d'etat, a group of young nationalist army officers under 
the leadership of Colonel Moammar el Khadafy were brought to 
power, deposing the aged king, who was convalescing abroad.
39Hibbard V.B. Kline, Jr. and L. Carl Brown, "Libya," 
Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968, pp. 121-22.
^^"Libya," The Europa Year Book. 1972, II (16th ed.; 
London: Europa Publications Limited, 1972), p. 913.
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The new regime declared a motto of "freedom, socialism, and
unity" and pledged itself to; remove backwardness; take an
active role in the Arab cause in "Palestine"; promote Arab
unity; and encourage domestic policies based on social
justice, nonexploitation, and an equitable distribution of 
41wealth. Former King Idris al Sanusi had been a stalwart
monarch. For the most part, the monarchy's strength was
derived from the great personal prestige of the king, whose
long resistance to Italian colonialism is legendary in his 
42country. All power is now centered in the Revolutionary 
Command Council. There is no national assembly and no 
political parties are allowed.
As oil revenues began to mount following the first 
major discovery in 1959, the government moved quickly to 
modernize the infrastructure and improve social conditions.
The First Five-Year Development Plan (1963-1968) was one of 
the most ambitious schemes ever attempted by an emerging 
nation, reaching almost^; L 300 million in total expenditures.^^ 
Despite some notable achievements, the rapid injection of so
41U.S. Department of State, Libyan Arab Republic. 
Background Notes Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1970), p. 3.
42Stanford Research Institute, Area Handbook for Libya 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing office, 1969), p. 3.
43Libyan law required that 70 percent of all oil 
revenues were to be invested in economic development projects.
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much wealth in the economy was difficult to absorb, leading 
to a unique situation described as "growth without develop­
ment , "
The traditional Libyan society has been slow to keep 
pace with the rapid economic expansion. The swift current 
of social change put in motion by the rise of the oil industry 
has only in the last few years outwardly altered the country’s 
social organization, which had remained oriented toward 
religion, the family, the tribe, and the region.
The dramatic development of the petroleum industry
released Libya from economic stagnation. Literacy was almost
nonexistent and poverty was extreme as evidenced by a Gross
National Product per capita in 1951 of only $39.^^
Petroleum revenues remain virtually the sole source of foreign
exchange constituting 85 percent of government revenues, and
45 46this trend should continue for the foreseeable future. *
Aside from the oil industry, industrial activity is 
confined chiefly to food processing and handicrafts. Industrial
44The estimated 1970 Gross National Product per capita
of $1670 is the highest in Africa. However, we must not place
reliance on this figure as an indicator of economic develop­
ment due to the extreme inequality in Libyan society.
^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Libya. Foreign Economic 
Trends and Their Implications for the United States Series 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 4.
^^In 1972 oil revenues were $1.6 billion. U.S. Depart­
ment of Commerce, Market Profiles for Africa-Libya. Overseas 
Business Reports Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1972), p. 22.
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development has been slow as a result of the small labor
force, an inadequate transportation network, and the absence
of major resources, apart from oil. The number of persons
in agriculture declines every year as a result of migration
from rural areas to coastal cities. Agricultural output has
not kept pace with the increased demand for food.^^
The 1972-75 Development Plan calls for investments
exceeding $3.8 billion over the three-year period. The bulk
of these resources will be allocated to agriculture and
industry, followed by projects in housing, transportation
(especially seaport and airport development), communications, 
48and education. Budget allocations for defense are very
large.
The Libyan economy has recovered from the downturn of 
1970 after its initial reaction to the 1969 Revolution and 
is now entering a stage of growth in all sectors. Petroleum 
production continues to decline as a result of Libyan conser­
vation policies, price rises for Libyan oil, and market 
forces in Europe. The near future should produce Libyan
demands for participation in the now foreign-controlled
49petroleum sector and greater Libyan development of
47Stanford Research Institute, Libya, pp. v-vii.
48U.S. Department of Commerce, Market Profiles-Libya.
p. 22.
49In December, 1971 the assets of British Petroleum 
were nationalized as a result of alleged British failure to 
prevent Iranian occupation of islands in the Persian Gulf.
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production and processing capacities. The near future will 
also determine the extent to which the government programs 
are capable of diversifying the economy from its dependence 
upon petroleum.
There is general unrest in the country due to the 
prospective unification with Egypt. The Libyan people fear 
the loss of control of their wealth and national identifica­
tion with the Egyptians. To counteract the growing opposition 
to the regime, Khadafy in 1973 has declared a vaguely-defined 
"cultural revolution" in order to strengthen his leadership 
position.
^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Libya, pp. 2-5.
TUNISIA
Tunisia, although the smallest of the three countries 
that comprise the "Maghreb" of northwest Africa, is more cosmo­
politan than either Algeria or Morocco.History and nature 
have combined to divide the northeastern coastal regions from 
the southern hinterlands. The coasts, with fertile soil and 
adequate rainfall for farming, are the historical locus of 
development in Tunisia. Only under the post-Independence 
government has a real effort been made to integrate the south
into the cultural, social, and economic life of the northern 
52region.
When Tunisia became an independent state in 1956 the
French Protectorate of Tunisia was at an end after years of
terrorism by the nationals and counter-terrorism by the European 
53settlers. In 1957 the monarchy was abolished and
^^The three states of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco 
constitute the area known to the Arabs as the Maghreb. The 
word means "The West" in Arabic. In 1969 the Maghreb had a 
population of 33 million inhabitants who also considered 
themselves part of the Arab world by language and history.
Libya and Mauritania are sometimes included as countries of 
the Maghreb. "Tunisia," The Middle East and North Africa; 
1969-1970 (16th ed.; London! Europa Publications Limited, 
l9é9), p. 703. Each of the Maghreb countries has signed or 
is in the process of signing trade agreements with the EEC. 
Tunisia on March 28, 1969, and Morocco on March 31, 1969, 
signed five-year trade preference agreements with the EEC. 
Algeria is now in the process of concluding a similar agreement. 
5 2Howard C. Reese, et al., Area Handbook for the Republic 





Habib Bourguiba became the first president. A disagreement 
with France over the continuation of the French naval base at 
Bizerta led to heavy fighting and the final withdrawal of the 
French. In May, 1964 Tunisia appropriated all foreign-owned 
lands as a step towards the socialization of the agrarian 
sector of the economy and in retaliation France withdrew most 
of her economic aid, which was resumed in 1966 upon the signing 
of a cultural agreement. In November, 1969 President Bourguiba 
was re-elected for a third five-year term.^^
The main support of the economy is agriculture, which, 
however, is subject to extreme fluctuation in yields due to 
varying annual amounts of rainfall. The fluctuation in yields 
brings about repercussions on standards of living and foreign 
trade. The necessary specialization ot certain regions in a 
particular crop further adds to the instability in the economy. 
Industrial production is responsible for only a small part of 
the national income,as its development has been hampered by 
Tunisia's past history as a French colony. Mineral resources 
are large and there is much opportunity for development of 
these resources. A major hope for the future is oil, which 
was first found in commercial quantities in 1964. Encourage­
ment is given to both public and private sectors, though the
^^"Tunisia," Europa Year Book. 1972, II (16th ed.; 
London: Europa Publications Limited, 1972), p. 1504.
^^A favorable factor in the country's industrialization 
plans is the existence of a well-trained managerial class.
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private sector lias to work within the framework of the 
government's development plan. In 1969 important trade 
preferences were granted through a partial association 
agreement signed with the EEC.
At present, the traditional family and social order 
is crumbling away in favor of a system based on Western 
values. The government has been the leader in effecting this 
change. President Bourguiba's rule has tended to be paternal­
istic with state welfarism being an integral commitment of 
the administration. In 1968 about one-quarter of the 
budget was devoted to education. The program of national
development, Destourian (Constitution) Socialism, is a 
synthesis of policies drawn from Western as well as Eastern 
experience within the national framework.
Popular resistance to modernization has been slight, 
reflecting regional differences in education rather than 
deep-seated hostility to the concept of change. The Tunisian 
government has sought to maintain cordial relations with
all capitals and to incur no political commitments when
58accepting economic assistance from abroad. Because of
Bourguiba's more neutral position on the Israeli question, for
the most part relations with the rest of the Arab world have 
59been strained.
^^"Tunisia," Middle East and North Africa, p. 710.
^^"Tunisia," Europa Year Book, p. 1504.
^®Reese, Tunisia, pp. 2-3.
59"Tunisia," Middle East and North Africa, p. 711.
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Foreigu aconomic relations have played a key role in 
the country's economic activity. Tunisia, like many develop­
ing countries who must export primary goods in order to 
purchase equipment for industrial expansion, experiences a 
constant deficit in the balance of payments. But foreign 
exchange credits, grants, and other forms of financial 
assistance, mainly from the West, offset this deficit. 
President Bourguiba's stable government and his commitment 
to a realistic overall development program for the nation 
have inspired confidence, making Tunisia attractive to some 
types of foreign investment, e.g., tourism.
^^"Tunisia," p. 710; Reese, Tunis la, p. 4.
ALGERIA
Algeria, an Islamic socialist republic in North 
Africa, became independent in 1962 after more than a century 
of French rule. Most of Algeria is part of the vast desert 
waste of the sparsely populated Sahara.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy although 
there is relatively little good farm land. The bulk of it< 
produce, which consists of wheat and barley and a variety 
of vegetables and fruits, comes from the region between the 
Tell Atlas and the Mediterranean, where the bulk of the 
population lives. The major exports today are petroleum 
and natural gas from rich fields discovered in the Sahara 
in the 1950s.
The territory of present-day Algeria was invaded many 
times and dominated by many peoples before the country won 
its independence in 1962. France secured control of Algeria 
in 1847 after struggling first with the Turks in 1830 and 
finally against native Algerian forces led by Abd-el-Qadir,
Large numbers of French and other Europeans settled 
in Algeria soon after the defeat of Abd-el-Qadir, and by 1900 
Europeans made up 14 percent of Algeria's total population.
^^L. Carl Brown and Hibberd V.B. Kline, Jr., "Algeria," 
Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968. pp. 3-4.
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The European settlers built up the Algerian economy, devel­
oping large-scale agricultural and industrial enterprises
62for the French market. But the development basically 
concentrated still more power in the hands of the French 
Algerians. During the period of French colonization the 
status of the Moslem Algerians was steadily reduced as 
European settlers gained the best land and used their poli­
tical and administrative control to change land tenure systems
go
to their own advantage.
By the early 1900s, the lack of economic opportunities 
and political inequalities created growing unrest within the 
Muslim majority:
In seventy years the Muslim people of Algeria had 
been reduced from relative prosperity to economic, 
social, and cultural inferiority. Three million 
inhabitants had died, tribes had been broken up, and 
the traditional economy altered during the prolonged 
/^French/ 'civilizing' campaigns. . . . The spread of 
nationalism throughout the Middle East and the after- 
math of the First World War, however, introduced the 
seeds of an Algerian national consciousness among the 
Muslim population, and marked the beginning of a 
reaction to the long period of French rule.°^
France attempted piecemeal reforms, one of which was 
the granting of French citizenship and therefore the vote to
^^"Algeria," The Middle East and North Africa: 1969-
1970 (16th ed.; London: Europa Publications, 1$&9), p. l4o.
63Norman C. Walpole, et al., Area Handbook for Algeria 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 1,
^^"Algeria," Middle East and North Africa, p. 140.
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all Algerian citizens, including women; but none succeeded 
in alleviating the growing hostility toward the French.
The Algerian desire for self-government grew following 
World War II. In 1954 an armed rebellion against the French 
was begun by the National Liberation Front (FLN). The FLN 
slowly won the allegiance of most of the non-European 
Algerian population during a bitter terrorist campaign against 
the French in the years that followed.
Finally, in 1960, after a military effort that brought 
500,000 French troops to Algeria and resulted in a series of 
French domestic political crises, French President de Gaulle 
agreed to negotiate with the FLN, Following months of nego­
tiating the French withdrew from Algeria. On July 3, 1962, 
after 12 years of French rule, Algeria became independent:
The war for independence hastened the breakdown of 
traditional Moslem society. During the long war more 
than 2 million Algerians moved or were moved from their 
rural villages into French-built regroupment centers 
as a security measure, and their way of life was thor­
oughly disrupted. In most cases, their poor but stable 
economy . . . was destroyed. The men were forced to 
eke out a living through work on public roads or in 
French-owned enterprises; to depend on government aid; 
or to flee to the cities or to the FLN rebels. Family 
life was broken, particularly as a result of the absence 
of the male household head; social mores and traditional 
social sanctions were weakened. Increasingly, women 
escaped the complete domination of their male relatives 
and husbands for the first timeV^
The fruits of victory were almost lost in a near civil 
war that erupted immediately after independence was granted.
^^Walpole, Algeria, p. 4.
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Ahmed Ben Relia, a leader of the FLN who had been imprisoned 
in France since 1956, made a successful bid for power with 
the support of the FLN army. By the end of 1962 Ben Bella 
had been elected premier by a newly formed national assembly, 
and he appeared to be securely in power. In June, 1965, how­
ever, Ben Bella was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by the 
army. Colonel Houari Boumedienne, a military leader of the 
independence struggle, emerged as the head of a provisional 
military regime.
The emigration of 90 percent of Algeria's European 
population of one million, soon after the country achieved 
independence, left Algeria stripped of its trained personnel 
and deepened the economic crisis that followed the years of 
struggle for independence. During the colonial era and in 
the early years of independence, the Algerian economy was 
characterized by very heavy emphasis on agriculture and a 
relatively static rate of economic growth. The economic 
picture for the 1970s is much brighter as the economy is 
experiencing a transformation due in part to expanding oil 
and gas revenues. The oil and gas deposits are the founda­
tions on which the regime plans to build a modern industrial 
66economy.
The transformation to an industrial society is felt to 
be the key to the future and the best long-term solution of
^^Walpole, Algeria, p. 1.
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the country's two major problems— reorganization of agri­
culture, and the utilization of surplus or underemployed 
labor. 68
Most foreign firms have been nationalized; autogestion, 
a form of management by the workers, has been experimented
with in industry but is now being replaced by orthodox state
1- 69capitalism.
The socialist, one-party government headed by Boumedienne 
is attempting to modernize the society through education, 
female emancipation, the development of an industrial urban 
economy, and the reform of land tenure and agricultural 
p r o d u c t i o n . A n d  despite severe population, unemployment, 
and agricultural problems, Algeria should experience a rapidly 
expanding economy. The Development Plan (1970-73) was 
structured towards the strengthening of the industrial infra­
structure and towards expansion and diversification of foreign 
trade, both important factors for sound economic growth.
^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Algeria, by Carolyn K. Klein, Overseas Business 
Reports Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1971), pp. 20-24.
^®In 1971, agriculture still employed 75 percent of 
the labor force.
^^"Algeria," The Europa Year Book. 1972, II (16th ed.; 
London: Europa Publications Limited, 1972), p. 512,
^^Walpole, Algeria, p. 5.
^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Algeria. p. 24.
MOROCCO
The kingdom of Morocco, the westernmost nation of the
Maghreb, regained its independence on March 3, 1956, after
forty-four years of French and Spanish rule. The lasting
influence of the Spanish was limited, but that of the French,
who ruled most of the country, was of considerable importance.
The military, the civil service, the modern sector of the
economy, the political parties, and the general structure of
the government bureaucracy are patterned after the French 
72models.
Morocco is endowed with a number of assets. The
country has an agreeable climate for tourists, varied soils
with good agricultural potential, and important mineral
resources. The industrial sector is small but has possibilities
for growth due in part to an expanding managerial and industrial
labor force. Adding to the expansion of the economy is the
fact that the economic infrastructure is at an advanced
stage. The beauty of the country and its climate offer
opportunities for the growth of tourism, which in 1971 was
73the second largest earner of foreign currency. Despite 
these assets, the economic performance of Morocco until
72Richard F. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Morocco 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19^1), p. 1.
7 3"Morocco," The Middle East and North Africa, 1969- 
1970 (16th ed.; London! Europa Publications, 1969), p. 520.
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recently was disappointing. However, for the period 1967-71,
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased at better than five
percent annually in real terms. Throughout the period the
largest contributions to GDP were made by agriculture
74(twenty-eight percent).
A primary economic goal since the mid-1960s has been 
to increase the output of the agricultural sector. The 
1968-72 Five-Year Plan provided relatively large amounts of 
money for dams (45 percent of total investment) and irrigation 
projects. Incentives have been given to the farmers in the 
traditional sector to use high yield seeds and to purchase 
fertilizers at a reduced price. Land reform has been 
undertaken.
The government has continually sought and skillfully 
used to its advantage foreign economic aid and technical 
assistance to implement its domestic development efforts.
There is a new Five-Year Development Plan covering the 1973-77 
period. Agriculture, tourism, and manpower training are 
scheduled to receive the highest priority. Special attention 
will be given to export promotion in view of the opportunities 
offered by Morocco's limited association (1970) with the EEC,
74Nyrop, Morocco, p. viii, 
^^Ibid,, p. 5.
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More attention will be paid to the social aspects of 
development.^^
Although only about seven miles from Europe, Morocco 
did not come under European rule until the 1900s. In 1912 
most of Morocco became a French Protectorate, Moroccan 
nationalism began to develop unity in the late 1920s. In 
1927 France placed Muhammad beu Yusuf (Muhammad V) on the 
throne, confident that he would act favorably to France.
But in 1953 France forced Muhammad to abdicate in order to 
n̂d his nationalistic activities, Ha went into exile but 
as a result, nationalist activities intensified. In 1955, 
France accepted the necessity of negotiating with Muhammad, 
and he returned to Morocco in triumph. Negotiations quickly 
led to independence for French Morocco, achieved on March 2, 
1956.
Muhammed V died in 1961 and his son. Hassan II, the 
designated and unchallenged successor, inherited not only 
the throne but also his father’s popularity and the nationalist 
sy,nbolism associated with him.^^
^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Morocco, by Laron L. Jensen and Maureen Smith, 
Overseas Business Reports Series (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 28.
77 The institution of the monarchy had become popularly 
identified as the symbol of Moroccan nationalism and of 
independence from alien, non-Muslim rule. Nyrop, Morocco, 
ch. 3.
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In 1962 with the adoption of its first constitution,
Morocco became a constitutional monarchy. However, in 1965
7 8Hassan assumed all executive and legislative powers. In
the Arab-Israeli war in June, 1967, the Moroccan government
gave vocal support to the Arab cause but did not commit its
troops to the fighting.
Hassan on occasion has experimented with democratic
institutions and constitutional procedures, but his rule
7 9has been an essentially personal one. In response to the
attempted coup in July, 1971 the King pledged to the people
that broad measures would be undertaken to eliminate
corruption and improve social conditions for the Moroccan
society. A new constitution was adopted in March, 1972
providing for some redistribution of power.
Morocco's most critical social and economic problems
are not unlike those of many other developing nations. In
mid-1971 the population was estimated to be increasing at
an annual rate of between 3.2 and 3.3 percent. Unemployment
is a serious problem nationally and a critical one in the
growing metropolitan areas where unemployment is in excess of
25 percent. Only 20 percent of the adult population is
Literate, yet there are a significant number of college
80graduates who are unemployed.
7 8Hibbard V.B. Kline, Jr. and L. Carl Brown, "Morocco," 
Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968, p. 133.
79Nyrop, Morocco, pp. v, 2.
^^Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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The prospects for political stability are doubtful.
Although the period since the unsuccessful attempt at a
coup d'etat in July, 1971 has been marked by some labor
unrest and student strikes, there has been no collapse in
public order and a fairly clear political and economic
81course has now been charted by the King. But a recent
organized attempt on the King's life, led by the Minister of 
Defense, has been interpreted as an expression of sentiments 
against the King. In particular, there are deep-seated 
feelings against Hassan for his alleged pro-Western stance, 
the continued existence of a large United States military 
base in the country, and his apparent more neutral position 
on the Israeli question.
81 U.S. Department of Commerce, Morocco, Foreign 
Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States 




Throughout the preceding chapter we have seen that
within the Middle-East-North Africa there are many unifying
factors that have shaped the area's continuing development.
The common Islamic heritage of all the countries remains the
most influential factor in contemporary society. Even in the
most Western and certainly least Muslim nation, Israel, matters
of family status are still strongly influenced by Muslim 
82institutions.
Two factors, which are interrelated, have initiated and 
accelerated the changes taking place in this part of the world. 
One is the discovery and rapid increase in output and profits 
of the petroleum industry; the other is the strong nationalist 
tide which has caused many of the states to match their poli­
tical sovereignty with economic power and independence through 
industrialization and the development of petroleum resources.
Since the end of the nineteenth century all of these 
countries have been strongly influenced by the West yet few 
have successfully adapted themselves to Western political and 
social systems, and today several are moving away from the 
adherence to Western institutions.
The Arab-Israeli conflict continues to permeate all 
discussions as to the future of this area. The root cause of 
the conflict is the Palestine problem, which has convulsed this
®^?eretz. The Middle East Today, pp. 451-52.
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part of the world and will continue to convulse this area and
possibly the whole world, until it receives a solution consis-
83tent with right and justice.
The most hopeful element in the future of this area is 
the presence of the vast petroleum resources which can be used 
to finance imaginative development and modernization schemes. 
But to close on a note of caution, such resources might also 
be used to prop up decadent and unpopular political regimes as 
well as to reinforce crumbling traditional institutions.
83Henry Cattan, "The Palestine Problem: The Palestinian
Point of View," in The Middle East: A Handbook, ed, by
Michael Adams (New York: Praeger, 15?1), p. TS’S.
CHAPTER V
QUANTITATIVE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL 
INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
Social scientists have long been in agreement that eco­
nomic development impies more than the technical and physical 
interaction of economic forces alone.^ Developmental economists, 
perhaps more than others, are keenly aware that the process of 
development is dependent upon and is powerfully affected by 
noneconomic factors encompassing the political, social, and 
cultural framework of a society. Too often, models and formal 
discussions of economic development have designated variables 
and relationships in which the consideration of human factors 
generally took second place, being mainly limited to the speci­
fication, ceteris paribus. The specification of the nature of 
the human factor effects generally qualifies rather than begins 
the discussion. The result is a proliferation of economic
^Economic development is defined in this study as "A 
process of many interacting forces, both economic and noneconomic 
in nature, whereby sustained increases in the standard of living 
occur." Dr. Alexander J. Kondonassis, David Ross Boyd, Professor 
of Economics, University of Oklahoma.
125
126
"models" of society that have neither social nor political 
antecedents or consequences, and in which "paths" of develop­
ment are explored that abstract substantially from reality.
The analysis of noneconomic factors has been largely 
hampered by an absence of empirical data and/or lack of 
appropriate techniques to ascertain the nature of their inter­
action with and influence upon economic factors. The current 
analysis of the influence of political instability on develop­
ment in the Mediterranean region constitutes a modest attempt 
towards the solution of an interdisciplinary theory of economic 
development. Hopefully, the specific contribution will be to 
hasten the shift in emphasis away from purely economic factors 
as instigators of change in economic performance to that of 
economic and noneconomic variables as being the causal agent 
in the developmental equation.
There are, however, limitations involved in any cross­
temporal analysis. Besides the general lack and reliability of 
data, there is the fundamental problem of the validity of the 
variables. Do the variables measure the same thing in different 
countries? The quantitative indicators used in this study are 
far from perfect. Progress continues to be made in the diffi­
cult area of quantifying noneconomic variables as well as in data 
2collection. Nevertheless, the results of the data analysis 
2The United Nations has been an active and leading force 
in this endeavor. See, for example, D, V. McGranahan, et al,, 
Contents and Measurement of Socioeconomic Development; A Staff 
Study of the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (New York; Praeger, 1971),
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must be accepted on the basis of the admitted measurement 
limitations.
The relationship between political instability and 
economic development is difficult to assess for a number of 
reasons. In the first place-, political instability variables 
are difficult to obtain data on, or frequently even to concep­
tualize into operational terms. Notwithstanding these limita­
tions, it is assumed that the instability events which range 
from protest demonstrations to coups d'etat are reflective of 
basic underlying dysfunctional social problems. The approach 
taken in this study is to avoid trying to isolate a single 
meaning of political instability so as to use it exclusively. 
Rather, seven indicators--some quite distinct, others not so 
distinct--are used to measure different aspects of political 
instability (see Appendix A).
The seven political instability indicators seem to cover 
all aspects of internal conflict which the Feierabends noted in 
their definition on page 4 of chapter II.
The other major concept of this study is economic devel­
opment. To capture both the per capita income growth and 
structural change aspects that are implied by Kondonassis' 
definition of economic development, a number of different indi­
cators were chosen. The selection of the ten indicators of 
economic development were taken from Arthur S. Banks' Cross- 
Polity Time-Series Data and are set forth in Appendix F.
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Having defined the two major concepts of political 
instability and economic development and given their quantita­
tive indicators, the hypotheses of this study may now be 
discussed.
Hypotheses To Be Tested
Chapter II reviewed the research of numerous authors 
who were concerned with the problem of the association between 
economic development and political instability. Many of these 
authors acknowledge the existence of the association but there 
are conflicting views as to its effects. Some have stated that 
economic development is a requirement for political stability, 
while others maintain that the developmental process is inher­
ently destabilizing. And some believe that political stability 
is necessary for economic development while others believe it 
is not. There are also many variations of these basic beliefs. 
At the same time, only a few researchers have concentrated 
their efforts in an investigation of the effects of political 
instability on economic development. As a result, there is no 
formal theory available that satisfactorily concerns itself 
with this specific relationship. So the matter has generally 
rested on observations in a variety of countries where the data 
bases used for such observations are rather different. This 
has led to debatable conclusions concerning consistency with 
respect to the generalization of the relationship. Following 
from this, the major interest of this research project is to
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investigate the effects of political instability on economic 
development for the nations of the Mediterranean region.
In Chapters III and IV it was noted that there were 
extended periods of relative political instability for the 
great majority of the countries in the Mediterranean region. 
This pattern, coupled with the writer's expectation of the 
joint occurrence of periods of decline or disruption in the 
economic development indicators, forms the basis for the first 
hypothesis. Specifically, this hypothesis is:
Political instability and economic development are 
negatively correlated for the seventeen countries of 
the Mediterranean region, 1948-1966, inclusive.
The second and major hypothesis of this study is:
Political instability has retarded economic develop­
ment for the seventeen countries of the Mediterranean 
region, 1948-1966, inclusive.
M e th o d o lo g y
The methodological approach taken in this study rests 
upon the assumption that there is a relationship between the 
dual phenomenon of political instability and economic develop­
ment. The writer believes that within this relationship the 
detrimental effects of political instability on economic 
development may not achieve their full impact in the same year 
in which the incident of political instability occurs. For 
example, a riot in year^ may adversely affect economic develop­
ment not in year^ but in year^^^ and/or year^^2 * To examine 
this idea, each independent variable will be lagged first one
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and then two years. Therefore, the focus of this research 
will be to indicate and compare both the direct and lagged 
patterns in the relationship between political instability 
and economic development. To accomplish these ends, the 
statistical technique of multiple regression analysis will 
be employed. Only a cursory summary of multiple regression 
analysis will be given in order to make clear the nature of 
the generalizations and empirical arguments made from the 
use of this methodological procedure. This procedure allows 
one to identify the amount of variance in a variable "explained"
3by two or more other variables. The 'coefficient of multiple
2determination' (R ) tells us the explanatory strength of a
linear combination of the independent variables. However,
2R is positively biased and tends to overestimate the true 
relationship. Hence, use will be made of the 'adjusted
mjycoefficient of multiple determination' (R ) which reduces the
9positive bias of R . The closer R approaches the value 1,0, 
the greater the independent variables explain the value of the 
dependent variable. For example, an R of .80 indicates that 
we have explained four-fifths of the variance in the dependent
3 In the case of multiple regression, whenever independent 
variables are highly intercorrelated, random measurement errors 
in some will tend to increase the apparent effects of those 
variables with which they are most highly intercorrelated, it 
is expected that high intercorrelation exists among the political 
instability variables since the concept of political instability 
may be viewed as unidimensional.
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—2variable Y. Consequently, the size of R will tell us the 
closeness of the relationship between the independent variables, 
P^, ?2 . . . Py, and each of the ten economic development 
variables, E^, Eg . . . E^g. In this study, the annual value 
for each economic variable is regressed against the correspond­
ing set of political instability variables for that year. A 
meaningful value for R coupled with negative values for the 
partial regression coefficients (as explained below) would 
confirm our hypotheses.
The b's in our multiple regression equation, Y^ = a + 
b^P^ + bgP2 + bgPg + , . . + byPy, 3re called 'partial regres­
sion coefficients' and show the average change in the dependent 
variable when there is a one-unit change in P^, holding the 
other P's constant. The b's show the slope of the regression 
plane. The a has the same unit as Y and shows the height 
(elevation) of the plane. In addition to the R being quite 
rich in its policy insights regarding the path of economic 
development, the sign of the b-coefficients also are of impor­
tance. Should the b-coefficient carry a negative sign, political 
instability will, ceteris paribus, tend to retard economic 
development, as that term is used here. There would appear, 
therefore, to be much truth in our major hypothesis concerning 
the relationship between economic development and political 
instability.
One general substantive point perhaps should be made 
about all these regression equations. In all our examples
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political instability bears the sole explanatory role. But 
in every case it is only a partial explanation, which, to 
produce satisfactory predictions, has to be supplemented by 
other variables. Neither economic nor noneconomic factors 
can stand alone in explaining the multifactor phenomenon of 
economic development.
A definite limitation of this study and similar studies 
in this area is the unavailability of sufficient data. Missing 
data can force researchers to exclude relevant variables for 
lack of an adequate number of cases to analyze. The data 
concerned directly with political instability are complete in 
this study. However, many of the indicators describing economic 
development characteristics of nations are not complete.
Hypotheses Testing and Findings Analyses 
The political instability and economic development 
variables used in this study are given below.
Political Instability Variables 
—  Protest Demonstrations
?2 —  Riots
Pg —  Armed Attacks
P^ —  Deaths from Domestic Violence
P^ -- Governmental Sanctions
Pg -- External Interventions
P-, -- Irregular Power Transfers
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Economic Development Variables 
-- National Government Revenue per Capita
E2 —  National Government Expenditures per Capita
Eg —  All Mail per Capita
E^ —  Imports per Capita
Eg —  Exports per Capita
Eg —  Total School Enrollment per Capita 
Ey —  Gross Domestic Product per Capita 
Eg —  Gross Domestic Product per Capita Originating in 
Industrial Activity 
Eg —  Energy Consumption in Kilograms per Capita 
E^Q —  Physicians per Capita
In Appendices C, D, and E are the summary results of
the multiple regression analysis for the countries under study.
Specifically, Appendix C gives the results of the regressions
without the lag structure while Appendices D and E, respectively,
present the regression results from lagging the independent
variables first one and then two years. Included in these
appendices are listings for each country in the study of;
(1) the dependent variables; (2) the independent variables with
a significance level greater than .60 as determined by a
two-tail t-test; (3) the relationship (positive or negative)
between the independent and dependent variables; and (4) the 
—9R value. Algeria, Malta, and Cyprus were excluded from the 
statistical analysis due to an insufficient number of
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observations. The number of dependent variables will vary 
for each country depending upon the availability of data.
Also, the number of independent variables will vary since 
those variables with two or less non-zero values for the 
nineteen-year period were excluded.
The t-test is used to determine whether the partial 
regression coefficients (b^) are significant as they relate 
to the dependent economic variable. Generally, a regression 
analysis is based on a scientific theory (economics, psychology, 
political science, agriculture, etc.) and if the t-value is 
deemed not statistically significant, then we have probably 
contradicted the scientific theory from which we started.
A small t is due to a large coefficient variance vâr (bu) or 
a small b^.
A small b^ may merely indicate that the relation 
between Y and X is not as strong as we expected. A large 
(b^) may be due to a small number of observations (which is 
true for many of the variables in this study). Another reason 
for a large vSr (b^) may be due to multicollinearity which is 
to be expected in this study since the indicators of political 
instability may be considered as largely unidimensional.
Furthermore, the presence of autocorrelation in the 
daLu (as indicated by the Durbin-Watson statistic) can cause 
us to accept the hypothesis that X is significant in explain­
ing Y, when in fact it is not. Hence we conclude that great 
care must be exercised in interpreting the regression equations.
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The findings of this study as presented in Appendices 
C, D, and E reveal that there are 42 percent more negative 
signs than positive signs for the significant partial regression 
coefficients. In general, therefore, there is partial evidence 
to support our first hypothesis that there is an inverse rela­
tionship between political instability and economic development 
for the seventeen countries of the Mediterranean Sea.
Although the adjusted coefficients of multiple deter- 
mination (R ) in general are moderate by standards of social 
research, this is by no means unexpected. The second and 
major hypothesis was not that political instability was a 
complete explanation of fluctuations in economic development 
for the seventeen nations but that political instability has 
retarded economic development. Therefore, the position is 
taken that the second hypothesis is also confirmed.
When a comparison is made between the European and 
non-European nations, we find that the relationship between 
political instability and economic development, as measured 
by R , is stronger for the non-European nations. An unconfirmed 
belief is that this difference would be even greater were more 
observations available on the development variables for the 
non-European nations. For during the stormy period of incipient 
nationalism and pre-independence demonstrations, very little 
statistical data of an economic nature is available. One can 
little doubt that such periods of violent unrest did decrease 
the stability and consistency of the growth in the economic 
development indices.
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When an examination is made to ascertain the pattern 
of the hypothesized relationships, some interesting commonal­
ities emerge. For the two European Communist countries 
(Albania and Yugoslavia) we find first for Albania that all 
but three of the significant regression coefficients are 
negative. And for Yugoslavia, all are negative with having 
a significant negative relationship with every economic 
variable. The R 's for both countries are generally high, 
the average R for Yugoslavia being approximately .50. For 
Albania, the R 's are highest when the independent variables 
are lagged one year.
Variables Pg and P^ are found in combination and negative 
in 95 percent of the regression equations for Italy. In 
addition, there occurs a preponderance of negative relation­
ships between the dependent and independent variables. Further,
O
the R 's average approximately .30.
The variable Pg was significant and negative in every
_2regression equation for France. However, the R 's were gener- 
ally low--only one equation having an R >.25.
Interestingly, the variable Pĵ  is significant and posi­
tive for the first twenty regression equations for Greece but 
is positive for only two of the last ten equations. Also, P^ 
is significant and negative for all thirty equations. As an 
inference, we might say that when the authorities take action 
to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat which 
is believed to be detrimental to the national interest (P^),
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economic development is consequently retarded. In contrast,
nonviolent protest by politically discontented groups (P^)
was found to be positively related to economic development.
It may be that the protesting groups attach a strong sense of
legitimacy to their government and passionately believe that
their protests will be heeded by the government. In addition,
—2the R 's obtained by the one-year lag of the independent
—9variables are by far the highest with only one R <  .30.
The results for Turkey may be considered as exhibiting 
much the same general pattern as Greece. The variable is 
significant and positive and the variable P^ is significant 
and negative for 60 percent of the equations. However, the 
R 's are generally low or nonexistent.
It is of consequence to note that for Spain variable P̂ , 
the most turbulent of the seven political instability indicators, 
is significant and negative for eighteen of the twenty lagged 
equations. Furthermore, the R 's are significantly higher for 
the lagged equations. This would seem to give converging 
evidence for the hypothesis of the lagged relationship between 
political instability and economic development.
A review of the findings for the non-European nations 
reveals a somewhat similar pattern as that for the European 
nations. For Morocco, the relationship between political 
instability and economic development exhibits the strongest 
relationship of all the nations under study. Every regression 
equation possesses an R^ —  .70. Variables Pg and P^ have a
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significant negative relationship in 57 and 40 percent of the 
equations, respectively. The hypothesized lag relationship 
is manifest in the findings for Morocco since the R 's for the 
two-year and one-year lag are larger, respectively, than for 
the non-lag equations.
During the period 1948-1966, Syria had ten irregular 
power transfers (Py). In the world, only South Viet Nam had 
as many. This act of either actual violence or the clear 
threat of violence reflects itself negatively in twenty-two 
of the thirty regression equations for Syria. There is a 
strong relationship between political instability and economic 
development in this nation for both the non-lag and lag struc­
tures as evidenced by the excess of negative relationships and 
—2generally high R 's.
Egypt shows a preponderance of negative relationships
for the non-lag regressions. The two-year lag regressions
command the highest R 's. Notably, of the ten one-year lag
equations there are a total of only two significant independent
— 9variables and only two meaningful R 's.
Following Independence in 1949, Libya enjoyed political
stability throughout the 1949-1966 period. The coup d'etat of
1969 that brought the present leader, Moammar el Khadafy to
power and the attendant political unrest are not embraced by
these data sets. This fact is reflected by the fewness of
—2negative relationships and meaningful R 's. Moreover, political
—2instability has no explanatory power, as measured by R , for 
any of the ten two-year lag regression equations.
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In contrast, Tunisia records a host of moderate to
—2high R 's with the highest set occurring when the independent
variables are lagged one year. For this particular set, seven
—2of the regression equations have R 's >  .70, with three being 
greater than .90.
For Lebanon, the wealthiest of the non-oil-producing 
nations of the Middle East, we find that Protest Demonstrations 
(P^) and Riots (Pg) occur negatively and in combination in 
twenty-four of the thirty regression equations. From our 
knowledge of the structure of the Lebanese economy and its 
vulnerability to incidents of political unrest, it is under­
standable why even these two relatively placid political 
instability variables would have such a uniform retarding 
effect on economic development.
The findings for Israel exhibit no discernible pattern 
as to a relationship between political instability and 
economic development. This is by no means unexpected. The 
Israelis since the inception of the Jewish state in 1948 have 
been bound by a homogeniety of purpose and direction that has 
tended to overshadow all other facets of life, including rela­
tions between the government and its citizens. However, the 
internal strains arising from the nation's rapid economic 
success, the widening economic and cultural gap between the 
Western and "Oriental" Jews, and the growing discontent over 
the government's failure to reach a permanent peace with the 
Arabs, portend future periods of internal discontent for Israel.
140
In summary, the findings reported here support the hypoth­
esized relationships that: (1) There is an inverse relationship
between political instability and economic development for the 
seventeen Mediterranean nations; and (2) Political instability 
has retarded economic development in this region.
An additional finding brought out by the research is the 
existence of a lagged relationship between political instability 
and economic development. Specifically, there are twelve percent 
more negative signs than positive signs for the significant 
partial regression coefficients without the lag structure. 
However, when the lag structures are incorporated into the 
regression model a dramatic change in the relationship occurs.
The difference becomes that of forty-two percent more negative 
than positive signs, almost a fourfold increase.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to present a statistical 
analysis of the basic hypotheses linking political instability 
and economic development and political instability's retardation 
effect on this relationship. It should be emphasized that the 
statistical analysis of this relationship is tentative and 
exploratory. But the advantages of an exploratory approach to 
the analysis of the relationship outweigh the considerable dis­
advantages of inadequate data at the present time. It is only by 
highlighting these inadequacies and underlining the theoretical
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importance of as yet inadequately measured variables that 
progress can be made.
The results discussed in this chapter demonstrate 
that there is support for our theoretical expectations that 
political instability and economic development are inversely 
related and that occurrences of political instability retard 
economic development. The expectation that this relationship 
would hold is based on the nonstatistical analysis of the 
countries involved (presented in Chapters III and IV) and on 
discussions with persons with first-hand knowledge of political, 
social, and economic events in the area under study. On the 
other hand, we need more precise knowledge as to just what are 
possible nonlinearities or tolerable limits in this relation­
ship. We know only that where political instability is 
generally increasing, balanced and consistent economic develop­
ment is significantly hampered. Nevertheless, it is not 
presumptuous to suggest for these nations that material atten­
tion should be given this relationship in developmental planning 
decisions by the central governments.
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The current analysis is a modest attempt to add to the 
limited base of knowledge about the extent and nature of the 
relationship between political instability and economic 
development.
A review of the literature relating to this relationship 
reveals a number of important findings. Perhaps most note­
worthy is the significantly greater number of studies which 
have investigated the effects of economic development on the 
political system. Some find that rising standards of living 
incite heightened aspirations which the political system 
cannot immediately satisfy. An unstable situation is created, 
leading to internal conflict behavior. Others note that 
rising standards of living are a prerequisite for political 
stability. Further, it is observed that few studies have 
examined the direct effects of political conditions on 
economic performance.
The political atmosphere, of course, is not the only 
factor that can affect the level of economic development. 
Clearly, resource and factor endowment, technology, the work 
ethic of the people, institutional factors, etc., also have
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an influence on economic performance in any country. After 
a fashion, the interrelationships of different levels of 
political, social, cultural, and economic variables in the 
developmental process are myriad. Therefore, it would be 
false to assume that political stability is the sole factor 
in determining the level of development.
A final judgment, if one could ever be made, would 
have to rest on detailed historical studies of regions and 
countries at different points in time. These historical 
studies would need to look not only at the relations over 
time between political stability/instability and economic 
development, but also at the complex of detailed political, 
social, cultural, and economic changes. Such an undertaking 
would require a covering of all historical periods and 
countries in which there have been occurrences of political 
instability and economic stagnation. This study repre­
sents an attempt to investigate a portion of that problem.
The nature and the extent of the systematic interrelationships 
between political instability and economic development for the 
seventeen nations of the Mediterranean Sea for the period 
1948-1966 are explored. A multiple regression model is 
formulated whereby the interpretation is made that a negative 
regression coefficient means that as political instability 
increases, the extent of economic development, on the average, 
decreases. The size of the adjusted coefficients of multiple 
determination (R^) is indicative of the degree of relationship
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between political instability and economic development. These 
two factors— negative regression coefficients and R --form 
the basis for the two hypotheses that are tested in Chapter V.
The results of the analysis show that a moderate and negative 
relationship exists between political instability and economic 
development for this region. Some may take exception to the 
moderate size of the adjusted coefficients of multiple deter- 
mination (R ) and the lack of an overwhelming number of signif­
icant regression coefficients with negative signs. The response 
to such criticism is twofold, in the first place R 's are 
expected to be moderate or low, or should be considered with 
great suspicion when they are not, since it is contrary to 
reason that economic development can be explained by a single 
factor.
Secondly, the procedure taken has not been to maximize 
statistical explanation, but to gain supportive evidence for 
theoretical explanations. If the size of the R 's is moderate 
to small and there are fewer negative b^ coefficients than 
anticipated, it is nevertheless important to have isolated by 
converging evidence the form of the relationship between the 
two concepts under study.
Complex though the relationship may be between political 
instability and economic development, the writer has attempted 
to point out both the political and economic factors deemed 
to be important in this relationship. The degree of inter­
relationship between the economic and political instability 
variables as seen through the panorama of a country's historical
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progression tends to support the view held by some develop­
mental economists that economic performance is tempered by 
the political setting in which economic activity takes place.
The observations concerning the validity of the stated 
hypotheses are interesting, primarily because they suggest 
that political instability may be a harbinger of economic 
conditions. That the evidence indicates political stability 
is an important aspect of overall economic development con­
firms expectations. Consequently, it would seem that recent 
public policies designed to control and harmonize harmful or 
potentially harmful political discontent in the countries 




Adams, Michael, ed. The Middle East; A Handbook. New York; 
Praeger, 1971.
Adams, Thomas W., et al. Area Handbook for Cyprus. Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing office, l9V0.
Adelman, Irma, and Morris, Cynthia Taft. Society. Politics, and
Economic Development; A Quantitative"Approach. BaltImore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
"Albania." The Europa Year Book. 1972. I. 16th ed. London: 
Europa Publications Limited, 1972.
"Algeria." The Europa Year Book. 1972. II. 16th ed. London: 
Europa Publications Limited, 1972.
"Algeria." The Middle East and North Africa: 1969-1970. 16th ed, 
London: Europa Publications, 1959.
Almond, Gabriel, and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963.
Aristotle. "Politics." When Men Revolt and Why. Edited by 
James C. Davies. New York: The Free Press, 1971.
Baker, Ernest. The Politics of Aristotle. London: Oxford
University Press, l432.
Banks, Arthur S. Cross-Polity Time Series Data. Cambridge,
Mass.; The M.I.T. Press, l97l.
Banks, Arthur S., and Textor, Robert. A Cross-Polity Survey. 
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964.
Bauer, Peter T., and Yamey, Basil S. The Economics of Under- 
developed Countries. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1'9̂ T.-------




Berkowitz, Leonard, "The Study of Urban Violence: Some
Laboratory Studies of Frustration and Aggression."
When Men Revolt and Why. Edited by James C. Davies.
New York: The Free Press, 1971.
Brezezinski, Zbigniew, and Huntington, Samuel, Political
Power: USA/USSR. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.
Brinton. Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution. New York:
Vintage Books, 1952.
Brown, L. Carl, and Kline, Hibberd V. B. Jr. "Algeria."
Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968.
Brown, L. Carl, and Melamid, Alexander. "United Arab Republic 
(Egypt)." Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations, 1968.
Bwy, Douglas. "Dimensions of Social Conflict in Latin America."
When Men Revolt and Why. Edited by James C. Davies.
New York: The Free Press, 1971.
Byrnes, Robert F., and Kish, George. "Albania." Cowles 
Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968.
________. "Yugoslavia." Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations, 1968.
Cattan, Henry. "The Palestine Problem: The Palestinian Point
of View." The Middle East: A Handbook. Edited by
Michael Adams’! New York: Praeger, 1971.
Collier's Encyclopedia. 1972.
Cowan, David. "Lebanon." The Middle East: A Handbook.
Edited by Michael Adams. New York: Praeger, 1971.
"Cyprus." Europa Year Book. 1972. I. 16th ed. London:
Europa Publications Limited, 1972.
Davies, James C. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." When Men 
Revolt and Why. Edited by James C. Davies. New York:
The Free Press, 1971.
_______ , ed. When Men Rebel and Why. New York: The Free
Press, 1971.
De Toqueville, Alexis. The Old Regime and the French Revolution. 
Translated by Stuart Gilbert. London: William Collins
Sons and Co., Ltd., 1955.
Dogan, Mattel, and Rokkan, Stein, eds. Quantitative Ecolog­
ical Analysis in the Social Sciences’! Cambridge, Mass.: 
M.I.T. Press, 1969.
148
Dollard, John; Doob, Leonard W.; Miller, Neal E.; Mowrer, O.H.; 
and Sears, Robert R. "Frustrations & Aggression; 
Definitions." When Men Revolt and Why. Edited by 
James C. Davies! New York; The Free Press, 1971,
Edwards, Lyford p. The Natural History of Revolution. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 19z7.
"Egypt." Europa Year Book. 1972. II. 16th ed. London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1972.
Feierabend, Ivo K., and Feierabend, Rosalind L. "Aggressive
Behaviors Within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-National
Study," When Men Revolt and Why. Edited by James C, Davies, 
New York: The Free Press, 1^71.
Feierabend, Ivo K,; Feierabend, Rosalind; and Nesvold, Betty.
"Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National
Patterns." Violence in America : Historical and Comparative
Perspective. Edited by Ted Gurr and Hugh Graham,
Washington, D,C,: National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence, 1969,
Feldman, Arnold S, "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of
Revolution." Internal War, Edited by Harry Eckstein,
New York: The Free Press, 1964,
"France." Europa Year Book. 1972. I. 16th ed. London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1972,
Fraser, Leila Hucko, "A Cross-National Analysis of Political
Instability and Economic Development," Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Illinois, 1971,
Free, Lloyd A, "Gauging Thresholds of Frustration," When Men 
Revolt and Why, Edited by James C. Davies, New York:
The Free Press, 1971,
Gilbert, Sara, and Issawi, Charles, "Lebanon," Cowles 
Encyclopedia of Nations, 1968,
Graham, Hugh D,, and Gurr, Ted R,, eds. The History of Violence 
in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives,
Report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes 
and Prevention of Violence, New York: Praeger, 1969,
"Greece." Europa Year Book, 1972, I, 16th ed. London:
Europa Publications Limited, 1972,
Gude, Edward W, "Political Violence in Venezuela: 1958-1964."
When Men Revolt and Why, Edited by James C, Davies.
New York: The Free Press, 1971.
149
Gurr, Ted. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative
Analysis Using New Indices." When Men Revolt and Why. 
Edited by James C. Davies. New York: The Free Press,
1971.
_______ . Ted R. "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife."
The History of Violence in America. Report to the 
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of 
Violence. Edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted R. Gurr. 
New York: Praeger, 1969.
Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University
--------presi-,T97r:------
Hauser, Phillip M. "The Social, Economic, and Technological 
problems of Rapid Urbanization." Industrialization 
and Society. Edited by B. F. Hoselitz and W. E. Moore. 
Paris: UNESCO-Mouton, 1963.
Heilbroner, Robert L. Between Capitalism and Socialism;
Essays in Political Economics. New York; Random 
House, 1970.
Herrick, Allison Butler, et al. Area Handbook for Greece. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing oi^ice,
Higgins, Benjamin. Economic Development. 2nd ed. New York: 
W. W. Norton and Co., 1968.
Hirschman, Albert 0. The Strategy of Economic Development.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958.
Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer; Thoughts on the Nature of 
Mass Movements. New York: The New American Library.
T93T:--------------
Hoselitz, B. F. "Main Concepts in the Analysis of the Social 
Implications of Technical Change." Industrialization 
and Society. Edited by B. F. Hoselitz and W. E. Moore. 
Paris : UNESCO-Mouton, 1963.
Hughes, H. Stuart. Contemporary Europe; A History. 3rd ed. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
"International Comparisons." Europa Year Book. 1972. II.
16th ed. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1972.
"Italy." The Europa Year Book. 1972. 16th ed. London:
Europa Publications Limited, l972.
"Italy." Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1970.
Edited by Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoi. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1970.
150
Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., l9éé.
Keefe, Eugene K., et al. Area Handbook for Albania. Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1^71.
Kelidar, Abbas. "Syrian Arab Republic." The Middle East:
A Handbook. Edited by Michael Adamsl New York:
Praeger, 1971.
Kline, Hibbard V. B., Jr., and Brown, L. Carl. "Libya."
Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968.
________. "Morocco." Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968.
Kondonassis, Alexander J. "Monetary Policies of the Bank 
of Greece, 1949-1951: Contributions to Monetary
Stability and Economic Development," Norman, Oklahoma, 
1964. (Mimeographed)
Kren, George. "Greece." Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations. 1968.
Kuznets, Simon. Modern Economic Growth. New Haven: Yale
Univers ity Press, 1955.
Leith. James A. "France." Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations, 
1968.
Lerner, Daniel. "Modernizing Styles of Life: A Theory."
The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the
Middle East. Edited by Daniel Lerner. New York:
The Free Press, 1958, 43-75.
"Libya." The Europa Year Book. 1972. II. 16th ed. London: 
Europa Publications Limited, 1972.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man: The Social Bases of
Politics. New YorKl Doubleday and Co., I960.
McBrayer, James D., Jr. "External Economic Linkages and
Political Instability in Latin America : 1949-1969."
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1972.
McGranahan, D. V., et al. Contents and Measurement of Socio­
economic DeveTopment: A StaÈf Study of the United
Nations Researcn Institute tor Social Development.
New York: Praeger, 1^71,
"Malta." Europa Year Book. 1972. I. 16th ed. London:
Europa Publications Limited, 1972.
Millikan, Max F. "The Political Case for Economic Development." 
Why Foreign Aid? Edited by Robert A. Goldwin. Chicago: 
Rand McNally and Co., 1963.
151
Moore, Wilbert E. "Industrialization and Social Change," 
Industrialization and Society. Edited by Bert F. 
Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore. The Hague: Mouton
Co., 1963.
"The Social Framework of Economic Development."
Tradition. Values, and Socio-Economic Development. 
Edited by Ralph Braibanti and j. J. Spengler. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1961.
Morgenthau, Hans J. "Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign 
Aid." Why Foreign Aid? Edited by Robert A. Goldwin. 
Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963.
"Morocco." The Middle East and North Africa. 1969-1970.
16th i3"! London: Europa Publications, 1969.
Needier, Martin C. Political Development in Latin America: 
Instability. Violence and Evolutionary Change.
New York; Random House, 1968.
Nelson, Eastin. The Economic Potential of Mexico. 1970-1975. 
Santa Barbara, California; TEMPO, 1959. Quoted in 
Higgins, Economic Development.
Nowell. Charles E. "Malta." Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations. 
1968. --- ----------------
________. "Spain." Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations, 1968.
Nyrop, Richard F. Area Handbook for Morocco. Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.
Nyrop, Richard F., et al. Area Handbook for Syria. Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.
Olson, Mancur, Jr. "Rapid Growth As a Destabilizing Force." 
When Men Revolt and Why. Edited by James C. Davies,
New York: The Free Press, 1971.
Peretz, Don. The Middle East Today. 2nd ed. New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1971.
Pye, Lucian. Aspects of Political Development. Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
Reese, Howard C., et al. Area Handbook for the Republic of 
Tunisia. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1970.
Roberts, Thomas D., et al. Area Handbook for the Republic of 
Turkey. Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office,TïïTïïr
152
Rose, Thomas. "How Violence Occurs: A Theory and Review
of the Literature." Violence in America. Edited by 
Thomas Rose. New York: Random House, 1969.
Rose, Thomas., ed. Violence in America. New York: Random
House, 1969.
Rummel, Rudolph J. "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within 
and Between Nations." General Systems. Yearbook of 
the Society for the Advancement of General Systems 
Theory, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963.
Russett, Bruce M. "Inequality and Instability: The Relation
of Land Tenure to Politics." When Men Revolt and Why. 
Edited by James C. Davies. New York: The Free Press,
1971.
Russett, Bruce M., et al. World Handbook of Political and
Social Indicators. New Haven; Yale University Press,
iwr.--------------
Said, Abdul A., and Collier, Daniel M. Revolution. Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971.
Schwartz, David C. "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior."
When Men Revolt and Why. Edited by James C. Davies.
New York: The Free Press, 1971.
Siegfried, Andre'. The Mediterranean. Translated by Doris 
Hemming. New York: Due11, Sloan, and Pierce, 1940.
Simmel, George. "Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations." 
When Men Rebel and Why. Edited by James C. Davies.
New York: The Free Press, 1971.
Smith, Harvey H., et al. Area Handbook for Israel. Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970.
Sorokin, Pitirin. Social and Cultural Dynamics. Vol. Ill:
Fluctuations of Social Relationships. War, and Revolution. 
New York: American,
"Spain." Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1970.
Edited by Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1970.
Stanford Research Institute. Area Handbook for Libya.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.
Stevenson, Hugh M. "Conflict and Political Instability in
Africa; a Theoretical Analysis Supported by Quantitative, 
Cross-National Comparison." Unpublished Ph.D. disser­
tation, Northwestern University, 1971.
153
Taylor, Charles L., and Hudson, Michael C. World Handbook of 
Political and Social Indicators. 2nd. ed. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1972.
"Tunisia." Europa Year Book. 1972. II. 16th ed. London:La , 2.
Europa Publications Limited, 1972.
"Tunisia." The Middle East and North Africa: 1969-1970.
16th e31 London: Europa Publications, 1969.
"United Arab Republic." The Middle East and North Africa.
16th ed. London; Europa Publications Limited, 1^69.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Basic Data on the Economy of
Algeria, by Carolyn K. Klein. Overseas Business Reports 
Series. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1971.
________. U.S. Department of Commerce. Basic Data on the Economy
of the Arab Republic of Egypt, by Richard M. Loughlin. 
Overseas Business Reports Series. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1972.
________. U.S. Department of Commerce. Basic Data on the Economy
of Cyprus. Overseas Business Reports Series. Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
Basic Data on the Economy of Greece, by John P. Edwards.
Overseas Business Reports Series.Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1971.
 . Basic Data on the Economy of Greece. Overseas Busines
Reports Series. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1972.
 . Basic Data on the Economy of Israel. Overseas Business
Reports Series. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1971.
 . Basic Data on the Economy of Morocco, by Laron L.
Jensen and Maureen Smith. Overseas Business Reports Series. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
Cyprus. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications
"Tor the United States Series. Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1972.
France. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications 
Tor the United States Series. Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1972.
154
U.S. Department of Commerce. Italy. Foreign Economic Trends and
Their Implications for the United States Series, Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
________ . Libya. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications
For the United States Series. Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1972.
________ . Market Profiles for Africa - Libya. Overseas Business
Reports Series. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1972.
________ . Market Profiles for the Near East and South Asia -
Turkey. Overseas Business Reports Series. Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
________ . Morocco. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications
For the United States Series. Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1972.
________. Spain. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications
For the United States Series. Washington, D.C.; Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1972.
________ , Turkey. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications
For the United States Series. Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1972.
U.S. Department of Defense, and Reid, Escott. The Future of the 
World Bank. Washington, D.C.: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 1965.
U.S. Department of State. Arab Republic of Egypt. Background 
Notes Series. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1972.
France. Background Notes Series. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1971.
 . Italy. Background Notes Series. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1970.
 . Libyan Arab Republic. Background Notes Series.
Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1970.
 . Malta. Background Notes Series. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
 . Republic of Cyprus. Background Notes Series.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.
155
U.S. Department of State. Republic of Turkey. Background Notes 
Series. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1971 «
Spain. Background Notes Series. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1971.
 . State of Israel. Background Notes Series. Washington,
D.C.: Government printing Office, 1971.
 . Syrian Arab Republic. Background Notes Series.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.
Yugoslavia. Background Notes Series. Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970.
Velized, Claudio. Obstacles to Change in Latin America. New York; 
Oxford University Press, 1965.
Ward, Barbara. The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations. New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1958.
Wolfe, Charles, Jr. The United States and the Third World.
Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967.
Wolf, Eric R. Sons of the Shaking Earth. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1959.
"Yugoslavia." The Europa Year Book. 1972. I. 16th ed. London: 
Europa Publications Limited, 1972.
Articles
Abramovitz, Moses. "Economic Growth in the United States."
American Economic Review. 52 (September, 1962), 762-82.
Adelman, Irma, and Morris, Cynthia Taft. "An Econometric Model 
of Socio-Economic and Political Change in Underdeveloped 
Countries." American Economic Review. LVIII, No. 5 
(December, I960), 1184-1219.
Banks Arthur S. "Modernization and Political Change: The Latin
Americans and Amer-European Nations." Comparative Political 
Studies, II, No. 4 (January, 1970), 405-18.
Beattie, Robert, Assistant Director, International Relations 
Archives, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
Telephone Interview, December 20, 1972.
156
Blaster, Cole. "Studies of Social Revolution: Origins in Mexico,
Bolivia, and Cuba." Latin American Research Review. II,
No. 3 (Summer, 1967), 28-64.
Buchan, A. "A Sea of Troubles." The Round Table: The Common-
wealth Journal of International Affairs (July, 1971).
W T5T.--------------------
Bwy, DiP. "Political Instability in Latin America; The Cross-
Cultural Test of a Causal Model." Latin American Research 
Review, II (Spring, 1968), 17-87.
Calvert, Peter A.R. "Revolution: The Politics of Violence."
Political Studies. XV,.No. 1 (1967), 1-11.
Cutright, Phillips. "National Political Development: Measure­
ment and Analysis." American Sociological Review. 28 
(April, 1963), 253-64:
Davies, James C. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American
Sociological Review. XXVIII, No. 1 (February, 1952), 5-13.
Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." 
American Political Science Review. LV (September, 1961), 
493-514.
Feierabend, Ivo K. , and Feierabend, Rosalind L. "Aggressive 
Behavior Within Polities, 1948-1962, A Cross-National 
Study." Journal ot Conflict Resolution. X (September.
1966), 249:71:--------------------------
Feierabend, Ivo K. ; Feierabend, Rosalind L.; and Nesvold, Betty. 
"Correlates of Political Stability." Paper Presented at 
the 1963 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, September 4-7, 1963.
Flanigan, William H., and Fogelman, Edwin. "Patterns of Political
Violence in Comparative Historical Perspective." Comparative 
Politics. Ill, No. 1 (October, 1970), 1-21.
Gregg, P.M., and Banks, Arthur S. "Dimensions of Political 
Systems: Factor Analysis of a Cross-Polity Survey."
American Political Science Review. LIX, No. 3 (1965),
602-l4.
Gurr, Ted, with Ruttenberg, Charles. The Conditions of Civil 
Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model. Research
Monograph No. 28. Princeton: Center of International
Studies, Princeton University, April, 1967.
157
Hoselitz, B. F. "Noneconomic Factors in Economic Development." 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. XLVII 
(May, 1957), 2 8 -41 .-----  ----- ---------------------------
Hoselitz, Bert F., and Weiner, Myron. "Economic Development
and Political Stability in India." Dissent, VIII No. 2 
(Spring, 1961), 172-79.
"Israel at 25." Newsweek Magazine, May 7, 1953, p. 51,
Kling, Merle. "Cuba: A Case Study of a Successful Attempt To
Seize Political Power by the Application of Unconven­
tional Warfare." "Unconconventional Warfare." Edited 
by J. K. Zawodyn, Special issue of The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political & Social Science. CCCXLI 
(May, 1962), 42-52.
Kondonassis, Alexander J. "The EEC and Her Association with 
Israel, Spain, Turkey, and Greece." Distinguished 
Lecture Series No. 3, Department of Economics, The 
Graduate School of Business, The University of Alabama,
1972.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: 
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy."
American Political Science Review, LIII (March, 1959), 
6'^-TC)'5.----------------------------------------
McNamara, Robert. Speech delivered to the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors on May 18, 1966, at Montreal,
Canada.
Merelman, Richard M. "Learning and Legitimacy." American
Political Science Review, 60 (September, 1966), 548-61.
Nesvold, Betty A. "A Scalogram Analysis of Political Violence." 
Comparative Political Studies, II (July, 1969), 172-94.
Pasture, Nicholas. "The Role of Arbitrariness in the Frustration 
Aggression Hypothesis." Journal of Abnormal Social 
Psychology, 47 (July, 1952), 728-31.
Ridker, Ronald G. "Discontent and Economic Growth." Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, XI, No. 1 (October,
19'6Sy, T -1 5 .------  --------------- * -
Rustow, Dankwart A. "Modernization and Comparative Politics:
Prospects in Research and Theory." Comparative Politics, 
I, No. 1 (October, 1968), 37-51.
Schneider, Peter R., and Schneider, Anna L. "Social Mobiliza­
tion, Political Institutions, and Political Violence:
A Cross-National Analysis." Comparative Political 
Studies. IV, No. 1 (April, 1971), 69-90.
158
Shannon, Lyle W. "The Demographic Characteristics of Non- 
Self -Governing Areas." Planning Outlook. V, No, 3 
(1960), 114-37.
"Is the Level of Development Related to Capacity 
For Self-Government?" The American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, 17, No. 3 (1958), 367-81.
________. "Socio-Economic Development and Political Status,"
Social Problems (Fall, 1959), 157-69.
Tanter, Raymond. "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within
Nations, 1958-1960." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
X, No. 1 (March, 1966), 41-65.
Tanter, Raymond, and Midlarsky, Manus. "A Theory of Revolu­
tion." Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI (September, 
1967), 25ZT30:--------------------------
Taylor, Michael, and Herman, V. M. "Party Systems and
Government Stability." American Political Science 
Review, 65 (March, 1971), 28-37.
Ulman, Neil. "Foreign Industry Pours Into Spain, Spurring 
Rapid Growth Accompanied by Growing Pains." Wall 
Street Journal, April 27, 1973.




Pĵ  —  Protest Demonstrations
A protest demonstration is a non-violent gathering of 
people organized for the announced purpose of protesting against 
a regime, government, or one or more of its leaders; or against 
its ideology, policy, intended policy, or lack of policy; or 
against its previous action or intended action. The protest 
issues involved are perceived as significant at the national 
level, but within that framework demonstrations directed at all 
branches and levels of government are included. This category 
of events includes demonstrations for or against a foreign 
government, its leaders, or its visiting representatives when 
such a demonstration is reported to indicate opposition to the 
demonstrators' own government.
This category excludes election meetings, rallies, and 
boycotts because such meetings are associated with a particular 
formal process that is unevenly distributed over the countries 
and time period covered, and because the variable is intended 
to encompass peaceful protest outside the formal structures 
of government. There is inevitably a degree of ambiguity over 
the criteria of "non-violence" in such demonstrations. Biased 
reporters may occasionally underplay or exaggerate the extent
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of turmoil associated with a particular gathering, just as they 
can misreport the size of a demonstration; but no particular 
direction of bias has been observed. The incompleteness of 
sources makes it impossible to assert that some damage and even 
occasional serious injury does not accompany some of these demon­
strations. But if destruction of property or bloodshed is 
observed as more than marginal to a demonstration, then the 
event is judged to have been transformed into a riot and is 
coded as such; it is not coded as a demonstration, even if it 
began as one. If there is some indication that a demonstration 
terminated peacefully, with the crowd dispersing, but that after 
a period of time a new crowd began rioting in the same place 
and presumably over the same issue, then two events —  a demon­
stration and a riot —  would be recorded.
? 2  —  Riots
A riot is a violent demonstration or disturbance involving 
a large number of people. "Violence" implies the use of physical 
force and is usually evinced by the destruction of property, the 
wounding or killing of people by authorities, the use of riot 
control equipment such as clubs, gas, guns or water cannons, 
and by the rioters' use of various weapons.
Riots, in comparison with demonstrations and armed attacks, 
are characterized by spontaneity and by tumultuous group behavior. 
This is not to assert that riot events are unplanned, but the 
riot organizers constitute a small, often invisible, portion of
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the rioters. Events were classified as riots if it appeared 
from the report that most of those involved were violently 
agitated in their behavior, that they formed an excited or 
confused crowd or mob, that they were engaged in unpredictable 
acts of disorder, and that the objects of their violence would 
not seem to be closely related to the objects of their political 
discontent in the analysis of a dispassionate observer. The 
data sources rarely reported the number of people involved in 
a riot, and when they did, there was no way of assessing the 
accuracy of the estimates. Therefore, it was impossible to 
assert that a riot involved, say, at least 100 people. In 
common parlance it is possible to speak of a riot involving as 
few as three people. It is doubtful that any of the reported 
riots involved that small a number; to be reported at all it 
is likely that their participants would have been numbered in 
the hundreds and thousands, rather than in tens.
Coders were instructed to distinguish between riots and 
armed attacks on grounds of apparent spontaneity of most of the 
participants. Violent raids against property and persons were 
occasionally reported; coders were instructed to exclude such 
events from the riots variable and to code them as armed attacks 
if they were directed by opposition to the government, or as 
governmental sanctions if they were directed by the government 
against its opposition. Coders were instructed to count as 
riots events that began as demonstrations but became riots.
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Such events were not counted as demonstrations. Riots taking 
place within parliaments or other ruling bodies were also 
included.
Pg —  Armed Attacks
An armed attack is an act of violent political conflict 
carried out by (or on behalf of) an organized group with the 
object of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another 
organized group. It is characterized by bloodshed, physical 
struggle, or the destruction of property. A wide variety of 
weapons may be utilized, including guns, explosives, bricks, 
spears, gasoline bombs, chemicals and knives. The category is 
intended to encompass all organized political violence in a 
political system, and it is intended to exclude all non-violent 
protest and incidents of turmoil (riots), as well as organized 
violence, such as crime, that is not observed to be directly 
relevant to cleavages, conflicts and issues in the state's 
political process.
The target of an armed attack typically is a regime, 
government, or political leader, or its ideology, policy or 
actions. The target may also be a religious, ethnic, racial, 
linguistic, or special interest minority. In cases of general 
insurgency in which a government may itself resort to organized 
violence, it may include an insurgent or rebel movement or 
pretender-government. Armed attacks are organized by political 
groups that wish to displace an establishment regime or gain for
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themselves substantial power or autonomy. Typically, these 
include liberation movements, revolutionary ideological parties 
and unintegrated minority communities ; in cases of major 
insurgency, the military and security forces of the state are 
included. When an insurgency situation reaches such proportions 
that the government can no longer control it by normal punitive 
measures (such as those coded as governmental sanctions), the 
government's actions as well as the insurgents' fall within the 
definition of armed attacks.
Examples of armed attacks include attacks on government 
buildings and personnel, public utilities, roads and transport 
facilities, dwelling places, factories, and markets. Occasionally 
whole villages are the target of armed attacks. Armed attacks 
are often reported as acts of sabotage, terrorism or liberation.
Excluded from the category of armed attacks, in addition 
to acts of non-political violence, are acts of political violence 
organized and carried out by foreign groups within the country 
(these acts are classified separately as interventions), except 
in colonies in which the forces of the métropole engage indigenous 
forces. Confrontations of the armed forces of two or more coun­
tries in a situation of international wars are also excluded, as 
are the security measures undertaken by governments in conditions 
short of civil war, such as raids and arrests. Assassinations 
are also excluded, but they have been coded separately.
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^4 —  Deaths from Political Violence
Unlike the other indicators, the number of deaths from 
political violence is not an event variable, but a body count.
The deaths reported occur mainly in conjunction with armed 
attacks, but also with riots and to a lesser extent with demon­
strations .
The category includes persons of the country who die 
participating in foreign interventions in the country, but this 
does not include foreigners. It excludes persons wounded in 
political violence. It does not include assassination victims - 
these are indicated in connection with the assassination variable. 
Nor does it include victims of political execution, deaths in 
enemy prisons, deaths in formal warfare, or deaths in border 
incidents with other countries. Victims of ordinary criminal 
homicide were of course also excluded,
—  Governmental Sanctions
A governmental sanction is an action taken by the author­
ities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat 
to the security of the government, the regime or the state itself. 
The category encompasses a diversity of governmental activities, 
but they share the characteristic of constituting specific 
responses to a perceived security problem at the national level, 
even though the sanctions are sometimes carried out by sub­
national governmental units, in conformity with the particular 
constitution of the state. An attempt has been made to exclude 
sanctions against criminal behavior that has no observed relevance
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to the political security of the state; thus there are no 
reports of crackdowns against organized crime or drives by the 
police to reduce crime in the streets.
Governmental sanctions may be directed against either 
perceived internal or external threats or interference. The 
category includes three types of action; (a) Censorship - an 
action by the authorities to limit, curb or intimidate the mass 
media, including newspapers, magazines, books, radio and tele­
vision. Typical examples of such action are the closing of a 
newspaper or journal, or the censoring of articles in the 
domestic press or dispatches sent out of the country, (b) Restric­
tions on political participation - this type includes general 
restrictive measures by the authorities, such as the act of 
declaring martial law, mobilizing troops for domestic security, 
or instituting a curfew. It also includes action specifically 
directed against an individual, a party or other political organ­
ization. Such specific actions include the removal of a govern­
mental official, reportedly because of his political beliefs or 
activities, the banning of a political party or acts of harass­
ment against it (like denying it a permit to hold a public 
meeting), the arrest of opposition politicians on ground of 
state security, the exiling or deportation of persons for 
political action or expressing opposition regarded as detrimental 
to the national interest, and the arrest or detention of persons 
reportedly involved in political protest actions, including 
demonstrations, riots, political strikes, armed attacks and
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assassination attempts, (c) Espionage - an action by the auth­
orities in which one or more persons (nationals or foreigners) 
are arrested or detained on charges of spying, sabotage, or 
prohibited interference in the domestic politics of the state 
constituting a threat to internal security.
One special characteristic of the governmental sanctions 
indicator is the variation in the boundary of such an event in 
time. One usually thinks of the severity of a government's 
control over political participation as a condition or a state, 
rather than in terms of a succession of events. A government 
that promulgates a censorship law, for example, is setting a 
constant limitation on political activity that may be unchallenged 
and therefore all the more effective. What is indicated is merely 
the frequency and concentration of sanction events. It is rela­
tively easy to determine when a sanction event begins but not 
when it ends. Its beginning is marked by a discrete action, a 
departure from the normal behavior or inaction of the authorities. 
For example, a report that "the government began a massive wave 
of arrests of subversive elements which is expected to last 
several weeks" would constitute a single sanction event, even 
though it denotes the beginning of a coherent process of behavior 
that may deviate considerably from the short time frame, simplic­
ity, and coherence of the typical riot or armed attack event.
A second characteristic is the heterogeneity of the 
indicators; the variety of governmental behavior it encompasses 
is wide indeed.
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Pg -- External Interventions
An external intervention is an attempt by an actor, 
whether another nation-state or a rebel group operating from 
outside the country, to engage in military activity within the 
target country with the intent of influencing the authority 
structure of that country. The data are listed by target, not 
intervening country and refer only to the initial intervention, 
not its continuation.
?7 —  Irregular Power Transfers
An irregular power transfer event is a change in the 
office of national executive from one leader or ruling group to 
another. The change is accomplished outside the conventional 
legal or customary procedures for transferring power in effect 
at the time of the event. Such events are accompanied either 
by actual physical violence or with the clear threat of violence, 
These events thus encompass bloodless depositions of rulers as 
well as the more spectacular sanguinary variety. In conformity 
with the general practice, no qualitative assessment is made 
of the subsequent significance of an irregular power transfer 
as a criterion for coding. Thus, such an event may precipitate 
a fundamental change in the political system, or the system may 
continue substantially unchanged except for the irregularity of 
the power transfer event itself.
Irregular power transfers are closer conceptually to 
what are conventionally thought of as coups d'etat. The only
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criterion for a "successful” irregular power transfer is that 
there be a report stating the new leadership actually have 
replaced the old, arrogating to itself the titles and functions 
of hief executive. No minimum tenure limit could be imposed 
as a criterion for "success” without being unwisely arbitrary.
Irregular transfers sometimes beget further irregular 
transfers during political crises. It happens even more 
frequently that an irregular transfer is closely followed by 
several other kinds of governmental change as a new regime 
seeks to consolidate and legitimize its position. After the 
coup, the coup leaders sometimes install somebody either inside 
or outside their immediate group as president or premier. Such 
events are coded as regular executive transfers because in the 
new power context such delegations or transfers of authority 
conform to new procedural norms and are not accompanied by 
threatened or actual coercion.
Irregular power transfers are initiated by groups, cliques, 
cabals, parties and factions either inside or outside a govern­
ment and its agencies. Sometimes they are carried out by 
rebellious elements within population minority groups and some­
times by foreign conspirators.
SOURCE: Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, World Handbook of
Political and Social Indicators (2nd ed.; New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 5-17.
APPENDIX B
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN NATIONS
Date of Years since
Country Independence Indeoei
Spa in before 1775 -
France before 1775 -




Turkey before 1775 -
Cyprus 1960 12
Syrian Arab Republic 1943 29
Lebanon 1943 29
Israel 1948 24
Arab Republic of Egypt 1922 50








Population Population Density Population
(millions) (per sq.km.) Annual Increase (%)
Spain 32.9 65 1.0
France 50.3 92 0.9
Italy 33.2 177 0.8
Yugoslavia 20.4 80 1.1
Albania 2.1 72 2.8
Greece 8.8 67 0.7
Turkey 34.4 44 2.5
Cyprus 0.6 68 1.1
Syrian Arab 5.9 32 2.8
Republic
Lebanon 2.6 254 2.5
Israel 2.8 136 2.9
Arab Rep. 32.5 32 2.5
of Egypt
Libyan Arab 1.9 1 3.7
Republic
Malta 0.3 1022 -0.3
Tunis ia 5.0 31 2.7
Algeria 12.9 6 3.0
Morocco 15.0 34 2.9
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APPENDIX B (Continued)
Literacy Rate Average Life Gross National
(7o) Expectancy at Birth Per Capita
Spain 95^ 70 820
France 99I 72 2460
Italy 95^ 70 1400
Yugoslavia 85^ 67 580
Albania 87 66 430
Greece 80 69 840
Turkey 46 54 350
Cyprus 76 66 970
Syrian Arab 39 53 260
Republic n.a.
Lebanon 86 but relatively high 580
Israel 84 71 1570
Arab Rep. 26 53 160
of Egypt
Libyan Arab 27 52 1510
Republic
Malta n.a. 70 710
Tunisia 30 52 230
Algeria 20 51 260
Morocco 20 51 190
172
APPENDIX B (Continued)










Syrian Arab Republic 67 45
Lebanon 55 41
Israel 10 79
Arab Republic of 57 43
Egypt





SOURCES: The data, unless otherwise indicated, have been
taken from "International Comparisons," Europa 
Yearbook. 1972. II (16th ed. ; London: Europa
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SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS;
ONE-YEAR LAG STRUCTURE
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Eĵ  Pĵ - .08








Variable Independent Positive (+), «
______________ Variables_______ Negative (-)__________ R
E 5 -  . 0 3
E g  +  . 0 8
Ey --
E g  P  2  “ . 3 8
^10
P5
A R A B  R E P U B L I C  O F  E G Y P T
E^ —-
E2 P ̂ - --
E g  . 5 3
E^
E g  . 2 3
Eg
E y  P g  - - -
Eg
E g  - -
^10
LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC
? 2  +  . 3 5
P3
E y  ? 2  +  . 2 7
P3




Variable Independent Positive (+), o
_______________ Variables_________Negative (-)________R
E 4  ? !  -  . 2 5
P2
P 3
E 5  P 3  +  . 2 9
P5
E g  P 3
P2
E y  ? 2  +  . 3 5
P 3
E g  P  2  « 4 0
P3 +
P5





E l  P 3  - . 4 1
E g  . 0 5








Variable Independent Positive (+), «




Eij P 2  -  . 7 7
*■3
E g  P 3  -  . 7 1
^6
Ey ?2 * .97
P3
P5
Eg Pg + .88
^3
P4











variable Independent Positive (+), _ 2
_______________ Variables Negative (-)_______R
MOROCCO
+  . 7 0
'’3
'’4
^ 2  +  . 7 0
^3
P4
E3 P3 + .95
P3
'■4
E 4  P j  -  9 6
'’3
P4
P  ̂  +  . 0 6
'’3
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Non-European Nations of the Mediterranean Sea 
(Independent Variables Lagged Two Years)
Dependent Significant Relationship:
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-- National Government Revenue per Capita 
E2 —  National Government Expenditure per Capita
Eg —  All Mail per Capita
E^ —  Imports per Capita
Eg -- Exports per Capita
Eg —  Total School Enrollment per Capita
Ey -- Gross Domestic Product per Capita
Eg —  Gross Domestic Product per Capita Originating in 
Industrial Activity
Eg —  Energy Consumption in Kilograms per Capita
E^q—  Physicians per Capita
SOURCE; Arthur S. Banks, Cross-Polity Time-Series Data 
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